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Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 S.W. 5th Avenue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Fax: (208) 888-2789 
Idaho State Bar No. 2397 
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
VS. 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 41, 
Employer, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. 15 
2 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special @den&$ Fund 
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 1 
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Law Offices, pursuant to J.R.P. Rule 15, and hereby petitions the Idaho Industrial 
Commission for a declaratory ruling and states as follows: 
I .  Petitioner ISIF ("Petitioners") hereby petition the Commission for a 
declaratory ruling regarding the construction, validity or applicability of a 
prior Lump Sum Settlement Agreement entered into between Petitioner and 
Claimant on the right of Claimant to maintain the current action against 
Petitioner. 
2. Petitioner hereby alleges an actual controversy exists over the construction, 
validity or applicability of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue 
pursuant to the following: 
a. Claimant filed Complaints against Employer Valley Vista Care Corp., 
surety State Insurance Fund and Defendant ISIF (LC. 90-702141) in 1991, 
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits for injuries 
sustained on June 28, 1990. 
b. On or about February 18, 1994, Claimant entered into a Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement with a11 the parties to that action. Under the 
Agreement, Claimant agreed to receive $6,500 in consideration for and in 
payment of any and all claims that Claimant may have had at the time of 
the Agreement or other claims Claimant could thereafter make for benefits 
against ISIF under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the State of Idaho. 
The Commission approved that agreement on or about February 8, 1994. 
c. Claimant filed the current Complaint against Petitioners on April 26,2006, 
in connection with a new industrial accident. Petitioners filed an Answer 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 2 
on , denying that Petitioner is entitled to receive any 
worker's compensation benefits in connection with injuries associated 
with the claimed accident, as Claimant has waived andlor is collaterally 
estopped from bringing new worker's compensation claims against ISIF 
by virtue of the terms of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue. 
d. Petitioners deny that they may be held liable for the payment of worker's 
compensation benefits to Claimant in this case since Claimant agreed that 
the earlier settlement fully, finally and forever discharged and released 
Petitioner form any and all future liability on account of Claimant. 
3. Petitioner further alleges that they have an economic interest which is directly 
affected by Claimant's failure to abide by the terms of the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement at issue. 
4. Petitioners' Petition for Declaratory Ruling is supported by the attached 
Memorandum and Affidavit of Verlene Wise filed contemporaneously 
herewith. 
/Z- 
DATED this - day of May, 2006. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
genneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for DefendantIISIF 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. RULE 15 - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
+ I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 7 day of May, 2006, a hue and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Charles L. Graham 
c/o Landeck Westberg 
PO Box 9344 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Mark T. Monson 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow. Idaho 83843 
by U.S. mail 
b y  hand delivery 
b y  facsimile 
b y  overnight mail 
Mallea 
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Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78  SW 51h Avenue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, Idaho 83680 
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Facsimile: (208) 888-2789 
Idaho State Bar No. 2397 
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho, Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
1 Claimant, 
VS. 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 41, 
I Employer, 
/ STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
I Defendants. 
NO. 03-515254 
AFFIDAVIT OF VEIXLENE WISE 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
:ss 
County of Ada 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERLENE WISE - 1 
VERLENE WISE, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I am the Insurance Claims Technical Advisor for Defendant, State of Idaho, Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF"), in the above-entitled action. I make this affidavit based upon 
the files and records maintained by the ISIF and upon my personal knowledge. 
2. I have been the ISIF's Insurance Claims Technical Advisor for three years. 
3. In the past twenty-eight (28) years, the ISIF has entered into over 1,045 Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreements (LSSAs) or other compensation agreements. Records prior to 1977 are not 
computerized or easily accessible and consequently are not included in this affidavit. Between 1977 
and May of 2006, the Commission has duly entered its approval and order in each case where a 
LSSA was utilized, resulting in a final and binding resolution of the pending case. 
4. Attached hereto, as "Exhibit A" is a true and correct copy of the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement executed on or about February 18,1994, between Claimant and ISIF, including the Order 
of Approval and of Discharge signed by the Idaho Industrial Commission. 
5. In entering into the LSSA in 1994, the ISIF settled all present and potential or possible 
future liability to the Claimant. The Claimant released the ISIF from all future liability 
regardless of the then present or any future accidents or injuries. The Industrial Commission 
approved said LSSA and duly entered its Order of Approval and Discharge thereon. Following 
the Industrial Commission Order, the ISIF duly paid the decreed sum to the claimant 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
UA &. 
VERLENE WISE 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERLENE WISE - 2 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 17 '~  day of May, 2006. 
ding at Meridian, Idaho 
commission expires: 8/16/06 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 17 '~  day of May, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by first-class mail, postage prepaid, and addressed to; by fax 
transmission to; by overnight delivery to; or by personally delivering to or leaving with a person 
in charge of the office as indicated below: 
Charles Graham 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
&U.S. Mail 
[ ] Fax 384-5844 
[ ] Overnight Delivery 
[ 1 Messenger Delivery 
Mark T. Monson 
P.O. Box 8456 
Moscow, ID 83843 
AFFIDAVIT OF VERLENE WISE - 3 
QUANE, SMITH, HOWARD & HULL 
700 Ironwood Drive, Suite 301 
P. 0. Box 1758 
Coeur dfAlene, Idaho 83816-1758 
Telephone: 664-9281 
Attorneys for Defendant ISIF 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECXE , 
Claimant, 
VALLEY VISTA CARE 
CORPORATION, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
I.C. 90-702141 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
Surety, I 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, I 
Defendants. 1 
IN CONSIDERATION of the premises and promises and 
covenants hereinafter set forth, and subject to the above-entitled 
Commissionfs Approval and Order of Discharge pursuant thereto, the 
above-entitled parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
FIRST: As hereinafter referred to, the parties shall be 
designated as follows: 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 1 
patsy Wernecke as Claimant, Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund as the Fund, and the Industrial Commission of the State of 
Idaho as the Commission. 
SECOND: On June 28, 1990, Claimant was employed as a 
nursers aide by Valley Vista Care Corporation, and on the same 
date, Claimant allegedly incurred injuries resulting from an 
industrial accident arising out of and in the course of employment 
with Valley Vista Care Corporation. These injuries include 
herniated disc at C5-6 and C6-7 which resulted in a two level 
anterior fusion on January 24, 1991. 
THIRD: Claimant contends, and the Fund denies, that 
claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and 
that the Fund is liable for a portion of Claimant's disability due 
to preexisting conditions. 
FOURTH: It is the contention of the Fund that there are 
..disputesconcerning: (1) whether Claimant suffered injuries as a 
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employ- 
ment on June 28, 1990; (2) whether Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled; (3) whether Claimant has a pre-existing 
permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Section 72-332 
Idaho Code; ( 4 )  if Claimant has a pre-existing physical impairment, 
whether said pre-existing impairment was manifest and constituted 
a hindrance or obstacle to Claimant obtaining employment; (5) 
whether in the event Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, 
Claimant has pre-existing impairments within the meaning of Section 
72-332, Idaho code, which contributed to said disability; (6) the 
extent of apportionment of liability for benefits between Defendant 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 2 
employer/surety and the Fund pursuant to Section 72-332, Idaho 
Code, in the event liability is assessed against the Fund. 
The parties hereto acknowledge that there are serious 
questions and, therefore, disputes concerningthe above issues. ~t 
is further acknowledged that this lump sum settlement is a 
compromise settlement of said issues as well as all other issues 
whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated 
by the parties. 
Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the 
commission by duly serving the Fund with appropriate pleadings, the 
timeliness and sufficiency as to form of said filings being 
conceded by the Fund. 
In consideration of this agreement, all parties stipulate 
that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be deemed to 
adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Workers1 
Compensation Laws of Idaho. 
FIFTH: Claimant was born on . At the time 
of the alleged accident, Claimant was a resident of Fernwood, 
Idaho. Claimant was earning $4.51 per hour as a nurse's aide. 
Claimant is currently unemployed and resides in Fernwood, Idaho. 
SIXTH: Following the 1990 accident, Claimant was treated 
by various physicians, whose reports are on file with the Commis- 
sion. Claimant was examined by Dr. David Ashbaugh at the request 
of the State Insurance Fund on April 28, 1992. Dr. Ashbaugh 
concluded that Claimant suffered a 20% permanent impairment rating 
based upon chronic pain as a result of her industrial injury. On 
October 13, 1992 Claimant was also examined by a panel of physi- 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 3 
cians at the request of the State Insurance Fund. The panel 
concluded that Claimant was capable of gainful employment on a 
reasonably continuous basis with restrictions of no lifting over 
thirty pounds or working overhead. The panel concluded that 
Claimant was stable and had an impairment rating of 16% of the 
whole person. Copies of these reports are attached. 
SEVENTH: It is understood and agreed by and between the 
parties hereto that the lump sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be 
paid to Claimant by the Fund is in consideration for and in payment 
of any and all claims that Claimant may now or hereafter have, 
including but not limited to every claim of whatever nature or kind 
for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary 
disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and all 
other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits 
against the Fund under the Workerst Compensation Laws of the State 
of Idaho. This is the case whether or not the full extent of 
Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now 
known or foreseen, and regardless of whether the Claimant shall 
ever again injure herself in another or future accident, or suffer 
any disease which would arguably cause the Fund to be liable for 
additional claims or benefits under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
Acceptance of this agreement by the Claimant according to the terms 
and conditions stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge 
the Fund from liability from any claims forever, regardless of 
whether such claims arise from the accident which is the subject of 
this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 4 
disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter 
a r isin-q. 
... 
. ., 
EIGHTH: In making this lump sum agreement and settle- 
ment, all parties acknowledge and agree that the Fund does not 
admit the allegations of Claimant, the same being solely for the 
purpose of adjudication and settlement of a doubtful and disputed 
claim. 
NINTH: It is in the best: interests of justice of the 
parties hereto that the above-entitled claim be fully, finally and 
forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump sum payment 
by the Fund to Claimant in the amount of $6,500.00 within a 
reasonable time following entry of Order of Discharge and approval 
hereof .by the Commiss.ion . 
TOTAL PERMr1NEEJT 
DISABILITY ~BENEPTTS :
Less attorney's fees and 
costs payable by claimant 
(from proceeds of lump sum 
settlement) $1,500.00 
RECOVERY TO CLAIMANT: $5,000.00 
TENTH: Claimant is represented herein and has been 
counseled by James Westberg of Moscow, Idaho, whose name shall be 
included as a payee on the respective settlement drafts to be 
delivered to said attorney by the Fund. Attached as "Addendum A" 
is an accounting from Claimant's attorney, James Westberg, setting 
forth the information currently required by the Industrial 
conmission pursuant to the Commissionfs administrative rulings 
under Section 72-803, Idaho Code. 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 5 
ELEVENTH: Upon Commission order approving this agreement 
and excepting only payment of said consideration by the Fund, the 
Fund shall be fully, finally and forever discharged and released of 
and from any and all liability on account of the above Claimant. 
TWELFTH: The terms of this agreement shall be binding 
upon all of the above-parties, their heirs, representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
THIRTEENTH: The parties waive findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and the right of appeal or to reopen these 
proceedings as part of the consideration of and for this agreement. 
The parties hereto specifically and expressly agree, as 
part of the consideration herein, that the parties waive the right 
to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided under the 
worker's compensation laws of Idaho, Section 72-718, Idaho Code. 
FOURTEENTH: This agreement is made at Claimantls request 
and is the acceptance of offer by the Fund. By this instrument, 
Claimant requests Commission approval hereof and Order of Discharge 
pursuant hereto; and the Fund joins in said petition and stipulates 
that it shall be granted. Claimant acknowledges that he has 
carefully read this agreement and legal instrument in its entirety, 
understands its contents and has executed the same knowing that 
this agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of 
any and all claims of every kind and character he has or may have 
against the Fund, and that these proceedings are concluded and 
forever closed by reason hereof, subject only to Commission 
approval and order, as aforesaid. 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 6 
FIFTEENTH: All portions of this instrument constitute 
binding covenants of the parties, and no portion is a mere recital. 
cke 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
county of ) 
On this lao, day of February, 1994, before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally 
appeared PATSY WERNECKE, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed my official seal, the day and year first above written. 
n 
(SEAL) 
APPROVED : 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 7 
ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE 
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT 
The foregoing stipulation agreement and petition having 
duly and regularly come before this Commission and appearing that 
the interests of justice and of the Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, are 
and will be served by approving said agreement and granting the 
order of Discharge as prayed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement 
shall be, and the same hereby is, APPROVED; and further, 
Said petition shall be and hereby is GRANTED, and the 
above-entitled proceedings against the Fund are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
DATED this & day of Febryary, 1994. 
Assistant Secretary 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - 8 
Kenneth L. Mallca 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 S.W. 5"' Avenue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Fax: (208) 888-2789 
Idaho State Bar No. 2397 
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant. 
VS. 
ST. MAIUES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 41, 
Employer, 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
RULING PURSUANT TO J.R.P. 15 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea 
Law Offices, and submits the following Memorandum in Support of its Petition for 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETlTON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1 
Declaratory Ruling. 
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1991, Claimant filed a Complaint for the entitlement of worker's compensation 
benefits against her employer, Valley Vista Care Corp., its surety, State Insurance fund, 
and ISIF, in connection with injuries she sustained resulting from an industrial accident 
arising out of her employment as a nurse's aide with Valley Vista Care. See Affidavit of 
Verlene Wise, Exh. A. In the course of that action, disputes arose among the parties 
concerning the issues of whether, among other things, Claimant was totally and 
permanently disabled, whether Claimant had a pre-existing physical impairment and 
whether Claimant actually suffered injuries as a result of the claimed accident. Id. 
On or about February 18, 1994, the parties entered into a Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement. Id. Under the Settlement, the parties agreed that $6,500 would be paid to 
Claimant and that Claimant, in consideration thereof, would release ISIF from any claims 
that Claimant had against ISIF at the time of the Agreement and any claims she may have 
in the future against ISIF. Id. The text of the Agreement specifically provides: 
..the lump sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be paid to Claimant by the 
Fund is in consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that 
Claimant may now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every 
claim of whatever nature or kind for medical expenses, prescriptions, 
psychiatric care, temporary disability compensation, permanent disability 
compensation and all other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter 
make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's Compensation 
Laws of the State of Idaho. This is the case whether or not the full extent 
of Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now known 
or foreseen, and regardless of whether the Claimant shall ever again injure 
herself in another or future accident, or suffer any disease which would 
arguably cause the Fund to be liable for additional claims or benefits under 
the laws of the State of Idaho. 
Acceptance of this agreement by Claimant according to the terms and 
conditions stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge the Fund 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 2 
from liability from any claims forever, regardless of whether such claims 
arise from the accident which is the subject of this cause, or any accidents, 
injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or deformities existing prior 
thereto or hereafter arising. 
Id. at pp. 4-5. 
In the Agreement, Claimant also acknowledged that she had carefully read the 
contents of the Agreement, understood it and executed it knowing that it forever 
concluded and finally disposed of any claims of every kind and character that she had at 
the time or may have in the future against ISIF. Id. at p. 6. The Commission approved of 
the settlement and issued an Order of Discharge on or about February 8, 1994. Id. at p. 8. 
Claimant filed tbe current action against the ISIF on April 26, 2006. See 
Complaint. Claimant alleges that, while working and cleaning tables for the school, she 
sustained injury to her right shoulder when the leg of a table she was moving fell off and 
the table dropped. Id. The injury allegedly occurred as Claimant caught the table and 
took its full weight. Id. Claimant asserts that her injuries and preexisting conditions, 
including chronic back pain, cholecystectomy, repair of patellar fracture right, 
bursectomy of prepatellar bursa left and neck fusion renders her totally and permanently 
disabled. 
11. ARGUMENT 
A. CLAIhlAST'S COJ1PI.AINT ACiAJIT ISIF IS BARKED PUKSUAST-T-Q 
THF DOCTIUII: COLLATEMI, ESTOPI'EL. 
The application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel necessarily operates to bar 
the Claimant from pursuing ISIF for liability for benefits in this case. In the prior suit 
between the Claimant and ISIF, Claimant completely and voluntarily released ISIF from 
liability for any and all claims, even if Claimant injured herself again in the future. Thus, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PETITON FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 3 
the Claimant should now be barred from asserting, in a new action against ISIF, that ISIF 
is liable for the payment of benefits in connection with injuries allegedly sustained in the 
industrial accident claimed in the Complaint. The issue of whether Claimant could ever 
assert liability against ISIF as to a future accidentiinjury was conclusively decided in the 
earlier case. 
In Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 849 P.2d 107 (1993), 
the Idaho Supreme Court set forth the appropriate test for determining whether collateral 
estoppel (or issue preclusion) will prevent a litigant from relitigating issues decided in a 
prior case: 
(1) Did the party "against whom the earlier decision is asserted ... have a 
'full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?"' (2) Was 
the issue decided in the prior litigation "identical with the one presented in 
the action in question?" (3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior 
litigation? This may be dependent on whether deciding the issue was 
"necessary to [the prior] judgment." (4) "Was there a final judgment on 
the merits?'(5) "Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party 
or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?". 
Id. at 439, 849 P.2d at 112. Collateral estoppel operates to bind a party even on issues 
not expressly resolved in the prior suit, if the resolution of such issues can be necessarily 
or inevitably inferred. Pocatello Zndus. Park Co. v. Steel W., 101 Idaho 783, 788, 621 
P.2d 399,404 (Idaho 1980). 
Before considering the application of collateral estoppel to this case, it is helpful 
to restate the doctrine and identify the values which it serves. Under the judicially- 
developed doctrine of collateral estoppel, once a court has decided an issue of fact or law 
necessary to its judgment, that decision is conclusive in a subsequent suit based on a 
different cause of action involving a party to the prior litigation. Collateral estoppel, like 
the related doctrine of res judicata, serves to "relieve parties of the cost and vexation of 
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multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent decisions, 
encourage reliance on adjudication." [Footnote and citations omitted.] United States v. 
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158, 104 S.Ct. 568,571,78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984), quotingAllen v. 
McCury, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414-15, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Accord 
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176,73 1 P.2d 171 (1987). 
There is ample authority for the proposition that the Claimant should be barred 
from pursuing ISIF for the payment of benefits in this case after having agreed to release 
ISIF from any and all liability in regards to any future injury or occurrence. Initially, it 
should be noted that Commission approval of a lump sum agreement constitutes a final 
judgment on the merits of a claim. Jackman v. Z~ldusfrial Special Zrzdeinitity Fund, 129 
Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997). Moreover, there is little question that the issue as to 
ISIF's future liability on account of Claimant was hlly and fairly litigated and actually 
decided in the prior lawsuit, as evidenced by the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
Courts around the country have agreed that a claimant may properly release and 
waive future workman's compensation claims against a defendant in the course of a 
settlement agreement. See, e.g., Moore v. Campbell, Wyatt & Cannon Foundy, 142 
Mich. App. 363, 369 N.W.2d 904 (1985) (Claimant signed a broadly-worded redemption 
agreement releasing the employer and carrier from liability for any other injuries which 
may occur during his employment and, thus, four years later when claimant petitioned for 
benefits for silicosis, the court held that the petition was barred by the agreement); Gates 
Rubber Co. v. Cantrell, 678 So. 2d 754 (Ala. 1996) (settlement agreement between the 
claimant and the employer releasing the employer from all future claims barred a later 
action for retaliatory discharge). 
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Certainly, a compensation agreement between the claimant and defendant(s) is 
final only as to those matters actually included in the agreement. See Woodvine v. 
Triangle Daivy, Znc., 106 Idaho 716, 682 P.2d 1263 (1984). Further, to the extent the 
agreement is ambiguous on an issue sought to be later estopped from litigation, collateral 
estoppel may not apply to bar a future action, as a court may find that the issue was not 
actually decided. Hawkes v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 2001 M E  8, 764 A.2d 258 
(2001) . "Unless a worker's compensation settlement agreement explicitly waives the 
right of the claimant to bring another type of claim against the insurer or the employer, 
such a waiver will not be implied in the absence of evidence of the intent of the parties at 
the time of contracting to create the waiver." Id. at 267. 
Here, there was no ambiguity in the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue. 
Claimant explicitly and fully discharged ISIF from liability from any and all claims 
forever, including claims related to a future injurylaccident not related to those raised in 
the litigation from which the Agreement was based. Claimant fully understood that the 
agreement forever concluded and disposed of all claims of any kind that she may have in 
the future against ISIF. The Commission, upon reviewing the Agreement to determine if 
it was in the best interests of Claimant, entered an order approving the settlement. 
Therefore, the issue of whether Claimant was barred from ever bringing a claim 
against ISIF in regards to a future accidentlinjury was fully litigated and actually decided. 
The Order approving the settlement and discharging the parties of liability had the effect 
of a final judgment on the merits. Claimant should be barred from attempting to re- 
litigate this issue against ISIF in this action by attempting to assert claims for liability 
against ISIF in contravention of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement. 
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B. CLAIMANT'S COMPLAINT AGAINST ISIF IS BARRED PURSUANT TO 
THE DOCTRTNE OF RES JUDICATA. 
The application of the doctrine of res judicata also demands that the Claimant he 
prevented from pursuing ISIF for liability for benefits in this case. Claimant is 
attempting to once again litigate the same claim as in the prior suit - her right to worker's 
compensation benefits - when that claim was fully adjudicated and concluded with a 
final judgment barring Claimant from asserting any future liability against the ISIF. The 
doctrine of res judicata generally demands that, in an action between the same parties 
upon the same claim or demand, "the former adjudication concludes parties and privies 
not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as 
to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Diamond v. 
Farmers Group, 119 Idaho 146, 148,804 P.2d 319,321 (1990). 
The law of res judicata reflects an expectation that parties who are given the 
capacity and opportunity to present their 'entire controversies' shall in fact do so. Thus, a 
valid and final personal judgment rendered in favor of a party or disposing of a claim bars 
another action by the plaintiff on the same claim. Id. With regard to the interpretation of 
the phrase "same claim or demand," Idaho has adopted the position of The Restatement 
(Second), Section 24, which provides: 
When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the 
plaintiffs claim . . . the claim extinguished includes all rights of the 
plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of 
the transaction . . . out of which the action arose. 
(emphasis added); See Diamond, 119 Idaho at 148. Comment (a) to Section 24 further 
explains the concept of a "claim" by stating that the present trend is to "see claim in 
factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of 
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substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be 
available to the plaintiff." 
Finally, the Idaho Court of Appeals provided guidance as to the correct 
application of the doctrine of res judicata when it stated: 
"Claim preclusion," or true res judicata ... treats a judgment, once 
rendered, as the full measure of relief to be accorded between the same 
parties on the same "claim" or "cause of action.". . . When the pIaintiff 
obtains a judgment in his favor, his claim "merges" in the judgment; he 
may seek no further relief on that claim in a separate action. Conversely, 
when a judgment is rendered for a defendant, the plaintiffs claim is 
extinguished; the judgment then acts as a "bar." ... Under these rules of 
claim preclusion, the effect of a judgment extends to the litigation of all 
issues relevant to the same claim between the same parties, whether or not 
raised at trial. 
Hindmarsh v. Mock, 2001 Ida. App. LEXIS 113, 6-7 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001). The 
application of this doctrine in cases in front of the Industrial Commission is only 
modified and tempered by the requirement that a decision by the Industrial Commission 
has res judicata effect only for those issues the Commission actuallv decides. See 
Dominguez v. Evergreen Res., Inc., 2005 Ida. LEXIS 1 18, 12 1 P.3d 938 (2005). 
There can be little doubt that the Claimant is once again trying to re-litigate the 
same claim that had been extinguished in a prior suit - her right to compensation for an 
industrial injury. In the prior adjudication, the effect of the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement was an adjudication of all worker's compensation claims that Claimant had 
against ISIF at that time or may have had in the future. The Commission necessarily 
decided the issue of Claimant's rights to present and future worker's compensation 
benefits during that case when it approved the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and 
dismissed the case. 
Clearly, Claimant cannot seek further relief under a claim for worker's 
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compensation benefits in this action when that claim was completely extinguished and 
final judgment rendered in connection with the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement in 
1994. That judgment acts as a bar to Claimant's right to pursue the same claim - the 
right to recover worker's compensation benefits as a result of an industrial accident - in 
this proceeding. Therefore, Claimant's suit against ISIF should be dismissed. 
C. CLAIMANT WAIVED HER RIGHT TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR 
LIABILITY AGAINST ISIF BASED ON A FUTURE INJURY. THE 
COMMISSION SHOULD ESTOP CLAIMANT FROM PROCEEDING 
AGAINST ISIF IN THIS ACTION. 
It is undisputed that Claimant had the opportunity to review the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement in the prior case, discuss its implications with counsel and 
executed it with full knowledge of its implications and her rights in regards to being able 
to assert future claims against ISIF of any type. Claimant was under no obligation to sign 
the Agreement. She voluntarily gave up the right to pursue ISIF for liability in any future 
worker's compensation claim in consideration for settlement of her 1991 claim. 
WAIVER: 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 432 (1981). "It is a voluntary act 
and implies election by a party to dispense with something of value or to forego some 
right or advantage which [the party] might at [the party's] option have demanded and 
insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff; 78 Idaho 364, 304 P.2d 646 (1956). "Waiver arising 
out of conduct is in the nature of estoppel." Idaho Bank of Commerce v. Chastain, 86 
Idaho 146, 383 P.2d 849 (1963). It is an equitable doctrine based upon fairness and 
justice and, in order to establish waiver the intention to waive must clearly appear, 
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although it may be established by conduct. Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Morning Mining 
Co., 122 Idaho 778,782,839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
Claimant cannot reasonably argue that she was not fully aware that she was 
waiving the possibility of asserting any future claim against ISIF of any type when she 
signed the Agreement. She voluntarily and intentionally relinquished her right to assert 
such future liability. Certainly, there is no statutoly language in the workers' 
compensation law or prior Idaho case law preventing parties to a worker's compensation 
suit from entering into settlement agreements barring a claimant from asserting any future 
claims against a defendant. As long as the agreement is clear and unambiguous and the 
evidence provides that the claimant clearly intended to waive such a right, the Agreement 
should be upheld and applied. Therefore, by application of waiver, Claimant's 
Complaint against ISIF should be dismissed. 
ESTOPPEL: 
In the alternative, the Commission should conclude that the Claimant should be 
estopped from seeking benefits from ISIF. 
. . .The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of 
benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a 
right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The 
doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to 
maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of 
which he accepted a benefit. KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,281, 
486 P.2d 992,994 (1971). The act of the party against whom the estoppel 
is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some 
disadvantage to another; or the person invoking the estoppel must have 
been induced to change his position. Id., 94 Idaho at 281,486 P.2d at 994 
(citations omitted). (emphasis added). 
The doctrine of quasi-estoppel does not require a false representation. It is designed to 
prevent a party from imposing an unconscionable disadvantage upon another, by 
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changing positions. Young v. Idaho Department of Law Enforcement, Alcohol Beverage 
Control Division, 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615 (Ct.App. 1993). "The doctrine of 
quasi-estoppel may be invoked against a person asserting a right inconsistent with a 
position previously taken by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the 
detriment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine." (citation omitted). Young, 123 
Idaho at 875. 
Claimant's complaint for payment of benefits against ISIF asserts a position that 
is inconsistent with the position previously taken by Claimant in the prior action with 
ISIF. Claimant had knowledge and a complete understanding of the fact that signing the 
Agreement was her acceptance of a lump sum payment of $6,500 in consideration for 
releasing ISIF of any future claims which Claimant may have had in the future against 
the Fund. Now Claimant bas attempted to take the inconsistent position that the prior 
Agreement does not operate to bar her current claim against ISIF, which position clearly 
prejudices and disadvantages the Fund. Claimant gained the benefit of receiving the 
lump sum payment and it would be unconscionable to allow Claimant to maintain the 
position that she may now assert claims against ISIF in contravention of her earlier 
position when signing the Agreement. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the Commission should estop Claimant 
from seeking benefits from ISIF and dismiss Claimant's complaint. 
111. CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons, ISIF respectfully requests that the Commission 
issue a declaratory ruling in accordance with the arguments set forth above and dismiss 
with prejudice the Claimant's complaint against ISIF. 
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& 
DATED t h i s o d a y  of May, 2006. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
/I /ZLi Y ~ A  
~6nne th  L. Mallea 
Attorney for DefendantlISIF 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
4 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the / 7  ay of May, 2006, a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Charles L. Graham 
c/o Landeck Westberg 
PO Box 9344 
Moscow. Idaho 83843 
Mark T. Monson 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
XX by U.S. mail 
by hand delivery 
by facsimile 
by overnight mail ks/ c- %a 
enneth L. Mallea 
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
LANDECK, W'ESTBERG, JUDGE & G W A M .  P.A. 
P.O. Box 9344 
414 S. Jefferson 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Claimant 
Idaho Bar No. 3839 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, ) 
1 
Claimant, 1 LC. No. 03-5 15254 
vs. 
ST. MARIES 
) MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
1 OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE 
JOINT SCHOOL 1 TO PETITION FOR 
DISTRICT No. 41, ) DECLARATORY RULING 
1 
Employer, ) 
) 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
) 
Swety, ) 
1 
anh ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL j 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY F W D ,  1 
1 
Defendants. 
) 
Claimant, Patsy Wemecke, by and through her attorney, Charles L. Graham of the firm 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A.. hereby moves the Industrial Commission, pursuant 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1 
CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
P.O. Box 9344 
414 S. Jefferson 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Claimant 
Idaho Bar No. 3839 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, I.C. No. 03-515254 
1 
VS. ) MOTION FOR EXTENSION 
) OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE 
ST. MANES JOINT SCHOOL ) TO PETITION FOR 
DISTRICT No. 41, ) DECLARATORY RULING 
) 
Employer, 
1 
and 1 
1 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 1 
) 
Surety, ) 
) 
and ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 1 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 1 
Defendants. 
Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, by and through her attorney, Charles L. Graham of the firm 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., hereby moves the Industrial Commission, pursuant 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING - 1 
J.R.P. 15.e. for extension of the time for filing Claimant's response to the Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling filed in this action by the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund. 
This motion is made on the grounds that Claimant's counsel, Charles Graham, will be out 
of the country from May 25,2006 through June 7,2006 and is unable to prepare and submit a 
written response to the Petition within the time allowed. Mr. Graham's affidavit is filed 
herewith 
Claimant respectfully requests that the time for filing of her written response be extended 
to June 2 1,2006. 
84 
Dated this day of May, 2006. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: 
Charles L. Graham 
Attorneys for Claimant 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE RESPONSE TO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
4, 
I hereby certify that on this 2q day of May, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
Ken Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
PO Box 857 
Meridian ID 83680 
X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
Mark Monson [ X ] U.S. Mail 
Mosman Law Offices [ ] Overnight Mail 
PO Box 8456 [ X ] Fax - 208-882-0589 
Moscow ID 83843 [ ] Hand Delivery 
c-L~+L 
Charles L. Graham 
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Claimant, 
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) AFFIDAVIT OF 
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ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL ) 
DISTRICT No. 41, ) 
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Employer, ) 
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) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL ) 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
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Defendants. ) 
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
P.O. Box 9344 
414 S. Jefferson 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Claimant 
Idaho Bar No. 3839 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 1 
> 
Claimant, 1 I.C. No. 03-515254 
VS. AFFIDAVIT OF 
1 CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 1 
DISTRICT No. 41, 1 
1 
Employer, 1 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, i 
1 
Surety, 1 
and ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
1 
Defendants. 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES L. GRAHAM - 1 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah 1 
Charles L. Graham, being first duly sworn, states of his personal knowledge as follows: 
1. I am the attorney for Patsy Wemecke, Claimant, in IC No. 03-515254. 
2. I received from the State of Idaho Special Indemnity Fund an Answer to Complaint 
and Petition for Declaratory Ruling pursuant to J.R.P. 15. on May 19, 2006. 
3. I have non-refundable airline tickets to Frankfurt, Germany on May 25, 2006, 
returning June 7,2006. I am traveling to meet my son who is completing a term of service with 
the Peace Corps in Turkmenistan. We have had the trip planned for almost a year. 
4. I attempted to contact Kenneth Mallea, counsel for ISIF, to determine if he has any 
objection to the extension of time. His office informed me he is out of the country until next 
week. 
5. I would greatly appreciate the Industrial Commission's accommodation of Claimant's 
request for an extension of time for filing of Claimant's response to ISIF's petition. 
&LU 
Charles L. Graham 
r- before me t h i s z  day of May, 2006. 
O M -  f .  f 2 ~  
Notarv Public in and for thb State 
of 1d&o, residing at m a3 C 0 
My commission expires: , 0 / 2  S/'" 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/f- 
I hereby certify that on this U /  day of May, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
Ken Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
PO Box 857 
Meridian ID 83680 
Mark Monson 
Mosman Law Offices 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow ID 83843 
[ X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ X ] U.S. Mail 
[ 1 Overnight Mail 
[ X ] Fax - 208-882-0589 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
C.L. h L  
Charles L. Graham 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY W d NECKE, 1 
1 
Claimant, 1 
I 
v. 1 
ST. MARIES JOLNT SCHOOL DIST. #41, ) IC 15-000083 
Employer, (03-515254) 
1 
and ) f  ORDER GRANTING 
) EXTENSION OF TIME 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) 
Surety, ) 
and F I L E D  
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 1 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
MAY 2 6 2006 
) 
) H%K1mjA aP,FI*W' 
Defendants. 
On May 24, 2006, Claimant requested additional time in responding to the Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling recently filed by Defendant Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). Claimant 
supports her motion with an affidavit indicating that her attorney will be away from his office in a 
foreign country from May 25, 2006 through June 7, 2006. The affidavit also indicates that her 
attorney was unsuccessful in contacting the attorney for ISIF prior to filing this motion. 
The Commission has fully reviewed the motion from Claimant and finds good cause for 
granting the same. A response by ISIF will not be necessary in this matter. 
Accordingly, the Motion for Extension of Time in filing the responsive brief to the Petition 
ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION OF TIME - 1 
for Declaratory Ruling is hereby GRANTED. As a result, Claimant shall have until June 23,2006 in 
which to file her brief in this matter. 
& 
DATED this &day of May, 2006. 
INDUSTRIAL. COMMISSION 
ATTEST: 
Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on thdmaY of % ,2006 a true and correct copy of 
Order Granting Extension of Time was served by reg& United States Mail upon each of the 
following persons: 
CHARLES L GRAHAM 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW ID 83843-9344 
MARK MONSON 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
cjh 
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
P.O. Box 9344 
414 S. Jefferson 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-1505 / 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Claimant 
Idaho Bar No. 3839 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
VS. 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT No. 41, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
1 
) I.C. NO. 03-515254 
1 
) MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO 
) PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RULING 
) 
and 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 1 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
1 
Defendants. 
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Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, by and through her attorney, Charles L. Graham of the firm 
Landeck, Westberg, Judge & Graham, P.A., submits the following memorandum in response to the 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling filed in this action by the State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund. 
I. Introduction. 
This case requires the Industrial Commission to determine the Industrial Special 
Indemnity Fund's ("ISIF") authority to enter into a lump sum agreement with a worker's 
compensation claimant which attempts to absolve ISIF from liability for total and permanent 
disability arising from a future injury to the claimant. Claimant Patsy Wernecke contends that 
ISIF does not have such authority under Idaho's worker's compensation statutes, and further 
contends that a lump sum agreement with ISIF which does not compensate the claimant for total 
and permanent disability, and which bars the claimant from asserting a future claim for 
compensation arising out of a future injury, is invalid and void as against the public policy of the 
State of Idaho. Claimant recognizes that a declaratory ruling in her favor may upset long- 
standing precedent and fundamentally alter accepted practice; however, her case is a glaring 
example of why the legislature could not have intended to allow ISIF to buy out of its statutory 
obligation to compensate claimants for total and permanent disability in disputed cases. 
11. Statement of Facts. 
Claimant Patsy Wemecke was first injured on June 28, 1990 while employed as a nurse's 
aide. She herniated discs at two levels in her neck, resulting in a two level cervical fusion. She 
filed a worker's compensation complaint against her employer, its surety State Insurance Fund, 
and ISIF. 
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Ms. Wernecke underwent two medical evaluations following her cervical fusion. Both 
concluded that she was capable of lighter work. The first was at University of Washington 
Harborview Medical Center. In a report dated April 30, 1992, David Ashbaugh, M.D. 
determined that Ms. Wemecke "should be able to work at employment that does not involve 
heavy lifting and use of her arms over her head for long periods." Affidavit of Charles L. 
Graham, Exhibit A. The second evaluation, by Drs. Alan Alyea and Mark Holmes, occurred on 
October 13,1992. It concluded that Ms. Wemecke should avoid lifiing over thirty pounds and 
should avoid working overhead. Graham Affidavit, Exhibit B. 
The surety paid PPI benefits for 16% whole person permanent partial impairment as a 
result of the 1990 injury. Ms. Wemecke then settled her claim with the employer and surety for 
an additional $30,000 (representing benefits for disability above impairment of 24.5% whole 
person, future medical benefits, and lump sum consideration). See Graham Affidavit, Exhibit C. 
Ms. Wernecke also settled her claim against ISIF, for $6,500. The Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement with ISlF ("Agreement") recites that "Claimant contends, and the Fund denies, that 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and that the Fund is liable 
for a portion of the Claimant's disability due to pre-existing conditions." Graham Affidavit, 
Exhibit D, p. 2 (emphasis added). Ms. Wernecke signed the Agreement and the Industrial 
Commission approved it. She was represented by an attorney. 
Ms. Wernecke returned to work as a custodian, within her restrictions, and was re-injured 
on October 8,2002. She is now left with a five-pound lifting restriction with her right 
(dominant) arm and contends that this restriction, when combined with a sitting limitation of 20 
minutes and low language and math skills, renders her totally and permanently disabled under 
the odd-lot doctrine. She has filed complaints against State Insurance Fund, surety at the time of 
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the October 8,2002 injury, and against ISIF. ISIF denies liability, contending that the 
Agreement approved by the Industrial Commission on February 8, 1994 bars any further claim 
against ISIF under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, and by waiver and quasi- 
estoppel. 
111. Argument. 
A. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement between claimant and ISIF is invalid 
under Idaho Code $72-318(2) because it is an agreement by the employee to 
waive her rights to compensation under the Worker's Compensation Act. 
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act is to provide "sure and certain relief for 
injured workers and their families and dependents." Idaho Code 9 72-201 (1971); Davaz v. 
Priest River Glass Co., I25 Idaho 333,337,870 P.2d 1292, 1296 (1994). In line with this 
fundamental purpose, the Act must be "liberally construed in favor of the claimant in order to 
effect the object of the law and to promote justice." Reese v. V-1 Oil Co., 141 Idaho 630,633, 
115 P.3d 721,724 (2005), quoting Haldiman v. American Fine Foods, 117 Idaho 955,793 P.2d 
187 (1990). Neither the Court, nor by implication the Commission, can "deprive the statute of 
its potency." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337. 
Consistent with its purpose to protect injured workers and promote injustice, the 
legislature enacted Idaho Code 8 72-3 18. This statute prohibits employers from requiring 
employees to pay any portion of the employer's worker's compensation premium, to contribute 
in any way to the cost or other security maintained by the employer for the purpose of securing 
payment of worker's compensation benefits, to contribute to a benefit fund, or to participate in 
any other device designed to relieve the employer from any liability created by the worker's 
compensation statutes. An employer who deducts any amount from an employee's pay for any 
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of these purposes is guilty of a misdemeanor. Idaho Code 9 72-318(1). The statute goes further, 
however, and prohibits all agreements which attempt to deny or diminish an employee's right to 
benefits. "No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this Act 
shall be valid." Idaho Code 9 72-318(2) (emphasis added). 
The question here is whether the lump sum settlement agreement between Ms. Wemecke 
and ISIF constitutes an invalid agreement to waive her rights to compensation from the ISIF in 
the event of total and permanent disability arising from a future injury. 
1. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement is an invalid agreement to waive rights to 
compensation. 
By its terms, the Agreement relieves ISIF from any obligation to Ms. Wemecke on 
account of any future injury. In paragraph SEVENTH, the Agreement provides that the lump 
sum payment of $6,500 "is in consideration for and in payment of any and all claims the 
claimant may now or  hereafter have.. . and all other claims that Claimant could now or 
hereafter make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's Compensation Laws of the 
State of Idaho. This is the case.. .whether the claimant shall ever again injure herself in another 
or future accident.. .." (emphasis added). The Agreement further provides that claimant's 
acceptance of the Agreement "shall fully and completely discharge the Fund from liability from 
any claims forever, regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the 
subject of this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, disabilities or 
deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter arising." Agreement, pp. 4-5 (emphasis added). 
ISIF asserts as the crux of its Petition that by signing the Agreement, Ms. Wemecke 
"released ISIF from liability for any and all claims, even if Claimant injured herself again in 
the future." ISIF Memorandum, p. 3. It both acknowledges Ms. Wemecke's attempt to waive 
her right to seek benefits from ISIF arising from a future injury, and depends on this release in 
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asserting that it can have no further liability. But it is precisely because the Agreement 
forecloses any claim against ISIF arising out of a future injury that it is invalid under Idaho 
Code $ 72-3 18(2). 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently considered the effect of Idaho Code $72-318(2) in 
Emery v. J.R. Simplot Go., 141 Idaho 407, 11 1 P.3d 92 (2005), where it addressed the Industrial 
Commission's authority to approve a stipulation by the employer and employee to dismiss a 
worker's compensation claim with prejudice under Idaho Code $ 72-508. The claimant 
contended that the stipulation to dismiss with prejudice amounted to an invalid agreement to 
waive his rights to compensation under Idaho Code 5 72-3 18(2). The Court disagreed. It held: 
Emery was not waiving his rights to compensation under the act. He stipulated to 
dismiss his claim with respect to the injury he suffered on March 10, 2001. The 
stipulation did not relieve Simplot of liability for any injury he might suffer in 
the future while employed by Simplot. 
141 Idaho at 410. 
The Agreement between Ms. Wernecke and ISIF is different. It specifically did relieve 
ISIF of liability stemming from any injury Ms. Wernecke might suffer in the future. The 
Agreement is expressly not limited to ISIF'S liability arising out of the June 28, 1990 accident 
and it is therefore invalid. 
Finally, the question whether Ms. Wernecke waived her right to compensation is 
answered by ISIF's Memorandum. See Memorandum, pp. 9-10. ISIF contends that the evidence 
shows that Ms. Wemecke "clearly intended to waive" her right to assert a claim against I S F  
arising out of a future injury and that "by application of waiver, Claimant's Complaint against 
ISIF should be dismissed." Id. p. 10. ISIF's assertion that "there is no statutory language in the 
worker's compensation law or prior Idaho case law preventing parties to a worker's 
compensation suit from entering into settlement agreements bamng a claimant from asserting 
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any future claims against a defendant" id., is simply wrong. It is precisely the waiver which ISIF 
asserts in defense of Ms. Wemecke's claim which renders her prior lump sum settlement 
agreement with ISIF invalid and which establishes the right to bring her claim now. 
2. The Agreement did not compensate Ms. Wernecke for total and permanent 
disability. 
Ms. Wemecke has a right to compensation against ISIF arising out of her October 8, 
2002 injury if she can prove that she is now permanently and totally disabled. Idaho Code § 72- 
332(1). With reference to the language of the statute, she is "an employee who has a permanent 
physical impairment" who has "incur[red] a subsequent disability by an injury arising out of and 
in the course of her employment, and by reason of both the combined effects of the pre-existing 
impairment and subsequent injury", has suffered total and permanent disability. The employer 
and surety are liable for payment of compensation benefits only for the disability caused by her 
most recent injury, and ISIF's obligation to pay the balance of benefits for total and permanent 
disability is mandatory: she "shall be compensated for the remainder of [her] income benefits 
out of the Industrial Special Indemnity Account." Idaho Code $ 72-332(1) (emphasis added). 
ISIF cannot avoid this mandate by paying a de minimus amount in a lump sum settlement in 
consideration for a waiver of future claims arising from future injuries. The Agreement cannot 
be permitted to nullify or limit the operation of Idaho Code § 72-332. To do so would clearly 
"deprive the statute of its potency." Davaz, 125 Idaho at 337. 
B. There is no statutory authority for ISIP to enter into agreements with claimants 
settling claims where ISIP denies that it is liable for total and permanent disability. 
ISIF was created by Idaho Code 72-323. In 72-324, ISJF's manager is granted power 
to administer the fund, including the power to "make agreements, subject to the approval of the 
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Industrial Commission, for compensation for injuries, and occupational diseases, in 
accordance with the provisions of this act." Idaho Code 5 72-324 (emphasis added). Any 
such agreement must provide compensation for injuries, not avoid the duty to compensate, and 
must be consistent with law. The Act does not authorize ISIF to enter into, nor does it authorize 
the Industrial Commission to approve, a lump sum payment abrogating ISIF's liability under 
5 72-332. Neither 5 72-404 nor 5 72-71 1 is to the contrary, 
Section 72-404 provides for a lump sum payment whenever the Commission determines 
that it is for the best interest of all parties that "the liability of the employer for 
compensation.. .be discharged in whole or in part by the payment of one or more lump sums to 
be determined, with the approval of the commission." Idaho Code 5 72-404 (emphasis added). 
"Employer" is defined in Idaho Code 5 72-102(12)(a) as "any person who has expressly or 
impliedly hired or contracted the services of another." ISIF is not an employer; it did not 
expressly or impliedly hire Ms. Wernecke. It is therefore not authorized to discharge its liability 
to Ms. Wernecke by lump sum payment under 5 72-404 and the Commission had no authority to 
approve the payment. 
In 5 72-1 11, relating to compensation agreements, the legislature likewise provided that 
"if the employer and the afflicted employee reach an agreement in regard to compensation 
under this law" a memorandum of the agreement is to be filed with the commission and 
becomes enforceable under the provisions of 5 72-735. Such a compensation agreement "shall 
be approved by the commission only when the terms conform to the provisions of this law." 
Idaho Code 5 72-71 1 (emphasis added). 
Again, ISIF is not an employer. Moreover, the compensation agreement between ISIF 
and Ms. Wernecke does not conform to the provisions of the law. It violates 5 72-318(2), as set 
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forth above. It also violates ISIF's obligation under 5 72-332 to compensate Ms. Wemecke for 
those income benefits for which the employer and surety are not liable. ISIF cannot reasonably 
argue that the $6,500 it paid to Ms. Wemecke was compensation for total and permanent 
disability; ISIF specifically denied she was totally and permanently disabled and denied 
disability for any portion of her disability due to pre-existing conditions. The $6,500 paid under 
the Agreement represented only an additional 7% whole person disability at the time and 
therefore constituted little more than consideration for the invalid waiver of Ms. Wernecke's 
right to compensation from ISIF arising out of any future injury. 
ISIF will likely argue that ISIF is statutorily authorized under Idaho Code 5 72-324 to 
enter into agreements of the kind it made with Ms. Wemecke. While the manager may, and 
routinely does, make agreements, subject to Industrial Commission approval, for compensation 
for injuries in accordance with the provision of the worker's compensation laws, it is not 
empowered to make agreements which relieve it from liability under 3 72-332. It is one thing to 
enter into an agreement with a claimant whom ISIF acknowledges is totally and permanently 
disabled, and which merely provides the method and structure for payment of benefits. It is quite 
another matter, and contrary to law, for ISIF to buy out of its obligation under 5 72-332 for a 
sum which comes nowhere close to compensating the claimant for total and permanent disability. 
The Industrial Commission simply has no authority to approve such an agreement. 
C. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Ms. Wernecke's 
claim against ISIF. 
1. Collateral estoppel. 
The purposes of collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, are to protect 
litigants from the burden of re-litigating an identical issue with the same party or its privy, to 
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promote judicial economy by preventing needless litigation, to prevent inconsistent decisions, 
and to encourage reliance on adjudications. Maroun v. Wyreless Sys., 141 Idaho 604,617,114 
P.3d 974, 987 (2005). 
ISIF and Ms. Wemecke agree that collateral estoppel bars re-litigation of issues 
necessarily decided as between these parties in Ms. Wemecke's prior action against ISIF. The 
question is whether ISIF's liability with regard to future injuries was, or was even capable of, 
being decided. 
The Agreement itself is notably unhelpful. It simply states that in consideration of the 
Agreement, "all parties stipulate that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be 
deemed to adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Worker's Compensation Laws 
of Idaho." Agreement p. 3. It further recites that the lump sum payment of $6,500 is "in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that claimant may now or hereafter have, 
including but not limited to.. .permanent disability compensation and all other claims a claimant 
could now or hereafter make for benefits against the Fund under the Worker's Compensation 
Laws of the State of Idaho." Id., p. 4. 
ISIF contends nonetheless that the Agreement "conclusively decided" whether Ms. 
Wemecke could ever assert liability against ISIF as to a future injury, Memorandum, p. 4., and 
asserts that Commission approval of the lump sum agreement constitutes a final judgment on the 
merits of the claim. Id. However, it is clear that a future injury would necessarily involve a new 
and separate claim with new facts, the merits of which could not possibly be decided by lump 
sum settlement agreement or adjudication before the claim ever arose. 
ISIF cannot credibly argue that the Agreement, and the Industrial Commission's approval 
of it, constitute a final adjudication that Ms. Wemecke was totally and permanently disabled 
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following the 1990 injury and that $6,500 fully compensated her for total and permanent 
disability in excess of the impairment and disability paid by State Insurance Fund. To accord 
collateral estoppel effect to the Agreement would be tantamount to finding that Ms. Wemecke 
waived her right to compensation from ISIF to which she might be entitled as a result of a future 
injury, a waiver barred by (j 72-318(2). 
2. Res judicata. 
Nor can the doctrine of res judicata apply. Idaho Code $72-718 provides, in relevant 
part, that "a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall be final and conclusive as 
to all matters adjudicated by the commission.. ." Idaho Code (j 72-718. According to the 
Idaho Supreme Court, the statute alters the traditional understanding of res judicata: 
We conclude that the legislature, by adding the phrase "as to all matters 
adjudicated," intended that decisions of the Commission be final and conclusive 
only as to those matters actually adjudicated. This is a departure from the 
concept of "pure res judicata," applied prior to 1971, which accorded decisions by 
the Commission finality and conclusiveness as to all matters which were, or could 
have been, adjudicated. Therefore the .... compensation agreement is only final 
and conclusive as to those matters actually considered by the Commission. 
Woodvine v. Triangle Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716,72 1,682 P.2d 1263 (1984). The 
Commission did not actually adjudicate Ms. Wemecke's future injuries because those 
injuries had not yet occurred. Ms. Wemecke is therefore not precluded from now 
bringing her claims relating to a subsequent and different injury in 2002. 
D. The common law doctrines of estoppel and waiver do not apply. 
ISIF's common-law waiver defense is thoroughly discussed above. As for its contention 
that the common law doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies because it would otherwise be 
unconscionable to allow Ms. Wemecke to maintain that she is entitled to further compensation 
from ISIF, this defense is without merit. 
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First, it is not unconscionable to rely on a statute, $ 72-31 8(2), when that statute renders 
the Agreement invalid. There is of course a purpose for this law. It recognizes that whether by 
economic necessity, coercion, mistake, or ill-advised decision, a claimant may be induced or 
may otherwise attempt to waive her right to worker's compensation benefits. The legislature has 
stated an overriding policy that such a waiver, for any reason, is invalid. Ms. Wernecke made an 
ill-advised mistake in entering into the Agreement and the Commission erred in approving it. 
The statute is there to protect Ms. Wemecke from her mistake and compels the Commission to 
correct its error. 
Moreover, an important element of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel is that the person 
against whom it is invoked must not only assert a right inconsistent with a position previously 
taken by her, but must have "knowledge of the facts and [her] rights." Young v. Idaho Dept. of 
Law Enforcement, Alcohol Beverage Control Div., 123 Idaho 870, 875, 853 P.2d 615,620 (Ct. 
App. 1993). ISTF cannot reasonably contend that Ms. Wemecke had knowledge of the facts of a 
fiture injury which was yet to occur. The doctrine of quasi-estoppel therefore cannot be raised 
as a bar to her present claim. 
E. To preclude Ms. Wernecke's claim against ISIF is against the public policy of the 
State of Idaho. 
The purpose of ISIF is to relieve employers of impaired or disabled persons of "the 
responsibility of paying for total disability compensation to [employees] rendered totally and 
permanently disabled because of [their] pre-existing handicap coupled with.. .subsequent 
industrial injuries." Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 197,200,439 P.2d 931,934 
(I 968). This policy encourages employers to hire impaired workers because they are relieved 
from paying total and permanent disability benefits if the employee is subsequently injured. Id 
By thus providing a source of recovery to an impaired worker who returns to work following an 
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injury, workers like Ms. Wemecke are encouraged and enabled to continue working and to 
remain productive if they are physically able. This clear societal good is lost if ISIF can avoid its 
statutory obligation under $ 72-332 by contracting it away. Equally important, if ISIF is allowed 
to avoid liability for Ms. Wemecke's total and permanent disability by paying her the equivalent 
of a 7% whole person impairment, the burden of her support is placed on the Social Security 
system and the social services safety net of the State of Idaho, a result the legislature, in 
establishing ISIF and the worker's compensation system as a whole, clearly intended to avoid. 
IV. Conclusion. 
The worker's compensation statutes do not permit a claimant to waive her right to 
compensation for future injuries. This is true whether the waiver is by agreement with an 
employer or surety, or the ISIF. ISIF had no authority to enter into the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement with Ms. Wernecke and the Industrial Commission had no authority to approve it. 
Claimant respectfully asks that the Commission to declare the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
invalid and to permit her to proceed with her claim against ISIF for total and permanent 
disability arising out of the injury on October 8,2002. 
DATED this & day of June, 2006. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
Charles L. Graham 
Attorneys for Claimant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this Z3rd day of June, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
PO Box 857 
Meridian ID 83680 
[ X ] US. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
C-I-LL 
Charles L. Graham 
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CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
P.O. Box 9344 
414 S. Jeerson 
Moscow, Idaho 83 843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Claimant 
Idaho Bar No. 3839 
BEFORE 'ITE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
1 
) LC. NO. 03-515254 
VS. ) AFFJDAWT OF CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
ST. MARES JOINT SCHOOL 
) 
DISTRICT No. 41, 1 
) 
Employer, ) 
and 1 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
) 
) 
) 
SwetY, 1 
and 
1 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY IWiW, 
) 
1 
Defendants. 1 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES L. GFLMWM - 1 
Charles L. Graham, being first duly sworn, states of his personal knowledge as follows: 
1. I am an attorney with Landeck, Westherg, Judge & Graham, P.A., attorneys for Patsy 
Wemecke in Industrial Commission Case No. 03-515254. 
2. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the report of an 
evaluation of Ms. Wemecke at the University of Washington Harborview Medical Center dated 
April 30,1992. 
3. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the report of an 
evaluation of Ms. Wemecke by Drs. Alan Alyea and Mark Holmes on October 13, 1992. 
4. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement entered into between Ms. Wemecke and the State Insurance Fund in 1994. 
5. Attached to this Affidavit as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement entered into between Ms. Wemecke and the Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund in 1994. 
EA 
DATED thish= day of June, 2006. 
rC 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN to before me this& day of June, 2006. 
~ d t a r y  P U ~ C  in g d  for the State 
of ~daho, residing at Pfi// ma0 , \lJA 
My commission expires: X-25- 2011 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 27 pA day of June, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy 
of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the manner 
indicated below: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
PO Box 857 
Meridian ID 83680 
[ X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ X ] Fax - 208-888-2789 w/-$ @#. 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
c l - ~ L  
Charles L. Graham 
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University of Washington 
Harborview Medical Center 
David C. Ashbough. M.D. 
Professor of Surgery 
Chief. Thoracic Surgery 
April 30,1992 
Kathy Proctor 
Claims Examiner 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
1215 W State Street 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720 
RE: Patsy Wemecke 
Qaim 0 / .2_/ 
SS #  
Dear Ms. Proctor: 
Iexamined Mrs. Wemecke and have come to the following conclusions: 
1. I do think she has a thoraac outlet syndrome which is contributing to her current pain problems but it is 
not responsible for the majority of her pain. I think most of her pain orij$nates somewhere around the C7, TI 
. . 
level in her cervical spind 
2. I think that she has an element of chronic pain syndnme. 
It is difficult to sort out in this patient how much each of these entities plays in her current pain problem but my 
inkling is that thoraac outlet component is probably the least significant and the chronic pain problem is the 
most significant. In regards to your other questions, it is difficult for me to make a correlation between her injury 
and her current thoraac outlet syndrome. Her initial complaints of pain were all in her neck and back and not 
down her arm and it was only later that she began to get radiation down her arm. Even at this time I feel that 
a significant portion of her pain is originating from her cwicalspine rather than from the thoracic outlet. It 1s 
conceivable that because of her injury she favored her l&bidie'dnd neck in such a manner that she developed a 
thoracic outlet syndrome, but I do not believe that th n' ry was a direct cause of the thoraac outlet problem 
- WY ;. 
-, .. . 
In response to your questions about further surgery, it is often difficult to predict whichpatient will get relief 
from thoracic outlet operations and those that do not. While there is a chance that she might be significantly 
improved, I would guess that she would still h a w  pain after removal of the scalenus muscles and fir$t rib. The 
only way to find out in cases like this is to actually proceed with the surgery. I would e s t j a e  her chances of 
success at 50/50 even with w . . @ r g e r y .  I do think that a multi-disciplinuy paid clinic referral 
. , 
might be advantageous in long term management of this patients discomfort. . . 
. . 
. .. 
Kathy Procbv 
April 30. 1992 
Page 2 
I think that Mrs. Wernecke is probably stable regarding her injury and I would estimate her disability at 20%. 
I base this on the fact that I find no evidence of atrophy or loss of sensation in her &and or arm. She does have 
some loss of strength in her grip and ability to lift. 'She should be able to work at employment that does n6t . . 
involve heavy lifting and use of her arms over her head for long periods. Lastly, given the fact that she 
claims to have had no symptoms prior to her injury, I cannot determiiie that there is any preexisting condition. 
I have enclosed a copy of my work-up. 
Youn sinceiely, 
&2d&fi a@ 
David Ashbauzh, MD 
professor of ~Gxy 
Regarding: 
Findings of a 
Medical Bramination 
of PATSY WWNECKE 
This report is intended to provide you with a fair and 
objective review of the medical facts relating to the 
claimant's circumstance, including those particular 
issues presented for our consideration. 
Orthopedist/Orthopedic Surgeon 
Regarding: 
Findings of a 
Medical Examination 
of PATSY WERNECKE 
This report is intended to provide you with a fair and 
objective review of the medical facts relating to the 
claimant's circumstance, including those particular 
issues presented for our consideration. 
~ a r g  D. Holmes. M.D. 
Kathy Proctor 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
1215 West State Street 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720 
Medical Examination of Patsy Wentecke 
Employer: Valley Vista Care Corp. 
Claim k' 9001812 
S.S. #
Date o 3/92 * 
Date of Birth: 
Date of Injury:  
Examining Physicians: Drs. Alyea and HolmeS 
Dictated bv: Dr. Holmes 
CHIEF COMPLAINTS: 
Intermittent left arm numbness and back pain. 
HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: 
This patient is a 40-year-old woman who presents with a history 
of symptoms dating from an injury that occurred on June 28, 1990. 
On that date, the patient was employed as a certified nurse's 
assistant for Valley Vista Care Center. Her injury occurred as 
follows: During the course of the day, the patient was engaged 
in her usual activities of lifting and turning patients. As the 
day progressed, she began experiencing pain, affecting the neck 
and back diffusely, but primarily affecting the back. At that 
time, she did not experience any symptoms affecting the 
extremities. 
The patient then consulted J. R. Katovich, M.D., a family 
physician. Dr. Katovich diagnosed acute back spasm and suggested 
conservative treatment including ice, Flexeril, Talacen and off 
work for six days. 
The patient noted that her symptoms did not improve. The patient 
notes that because she failed to improve, she was kept off work 
for an additional several weeks, and she was started on a program 
of physical therapy. 
The records indicate that an x-ray of the cervical Spine 
performed on July 26, 1990, demonstrated failure of segmentation 
Of C4-5, but otherwise no evidence of acute fracture. The Study 
was interpreted by J. T. Brockley, M.D., of Benewah C O ~ U ~ ~ ~ Y  
Hospital in Saint Maries, Idaho. 
The patient believes that she went to physical therapy off and on 
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for a period of time of almost one year. 
Follow-up with Dr. Katovich on August 15, 1990, ' demonstrated no 
significant improvement. 
On August 20, 1990, the patient saw J. T. Giesen, M.D., who 
indicated that the patient's condition was still characterized by 
significant headaches, neck and back pain. He recommended at 
that time a magnetic resonance imaging (KRI) scan be performed. 
An MRI scan performed on August 31, 1990, of the cervical spine 
documented Ill. Blocked vertebra C4-5. 2. Moderate central disc 
protrusion C5-6. 3. Moderate left paramedian disc protrusion 
C6-7." The study was interpreted by C. E. Ley, M.D. 
Incidently, skull films performed on August'.31, 1990, were 
normal. 
On September 5 ,  1990, Dr. Giesen suggested that in view of the 
imaging findings, that a referral to Ernst C. Fokes, Jr., M.D., 
was appropriate. 
On September 17, 1990, Dr. Fokes, a neurosurgeon in Coeur 
dtAlene, Idaho, examined Ms. Wernecke. His examination disclosed 
normal sensorium, no motor findings, symmetric and normal 
reflexes and normal sensation. His clinical impression was 
"Cervical spondylochondrosis without nerve root or cord 
impingement. It 
Dr. Fokes suggested that the patient's symptoms affectixig the 
left hand at that time could well be a "mild carpal tunnel 
 syndrome.^^ He felt that there was no indication for surgical 
treatment at that time. He did suggest further conservative 
treatment including traction, anti-inflammatory medications' and 
also suggested that she could return to work. 
The patient indicates that she did return to work after that 
visit, but was only able to work for two and a half days and 
stopped because of increasing symptoms. 
The patient was then seen by Graeme French, M.D., of Moscow, 
Idaho. On October 11, 1990, Dr. French felt that electromyograms 
(EMGs) and nerve conduction studies were indicated and, if these 
studies were consistent with the C6-7 radiculopathy, that a 
two-level cervical fusion was indicated. 
On October 29, 1990, the patient underwent neurodiagnostic 
studies by Merle Janes, M.D., of Spokane, Washington. Dr. Janes' 
findings included "1. Nerve conduction studies WNL; therefore no 
symptoms can be ascribed to peripheral nerve injury; neither can 
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any found myopathy. 2. EMG data pattern consistent with C5 and 
C6 radiculopathy, right, and C6, left. Pattern shows mixed acute 
and chronic findings, the majority chronic." 
On November 1, 1990, Dr. French reviewed the patient/$ 
electrodiagnostic studies. 
On December 10, 1990, Dr. Janes evaluated the patient clinically. 
Dr. Janes found no motor findings. He felt that there was . 
diminished sensation to pinprick, vibration, and cold in the left 
C8 dermatome. Neck range of motion was felt to be three-quarters 
normal. His clinical examination was right C5-6 radiculopathy, 
reduced neck range of motion secondary to radiculopathy, and 
myofascial pain and tenderness secondary to the two above 
conditions. 
On January 21, 1991, Dr. French reevaluated the patient and 
suggested the possibility of a two-level anterior cervical 
fusion. 
On January 24, 1991, the operative procedure was performed. This 
consisted of an "anterior cervical fusion with right iliac crest 
graft, C5-6, C6-7.cc The preoperative and postoperative diagnoses 
included "herniated disc, C5-6, C6-7." 
The patient indicates that she did experience some improvement, 
especially in neck pain, after the surgery, but left upper 
extremity numbness and paresthesias persist up to the present 
time. 
On February 2, 1991, Dr. French examined the patient on 
follow-up. At that time, postoperative hoarseness was still 
present, and the patient notes that hoarseness continued for 
about three months. 
Follow-up notes with Dr. French are noted for March 28, 1991, 
April 1, 1991, and April 5, 1991. On the latter visit, Dr. 
French in his note indicates that the patient's MRI scan was 
"basically normal except for a little foramina1 stenosis." 
A formal report of a second MRI, which was performed on March 2 7 ,  
1991, and interpreted by R. L. Romey, M.D., disclosed "1. 
... evidence of cervical fusion at C5-6 and C6-7. 2. 
Klippel-Feil deformity at C4-5 with no significant narrowing and 
certainly no herniated disc at this level. 3. C-Spine MRI 
otherwise unremarkable." 
The patient also underwent a course of physical therapy through 
the spring of 1991. Follow-up notes with Dr. French are 
indicated as having occurred on May 23, 1991, and June 27, 1991. 
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Regarding the latter visit, Dr. French noted that the patient did 
not exhibit any definite neurological findings. 
The records indicate that on August 2, 1991, Dr. French Suggested 
referral to Henry W. Gerber, M.D., in Spokane, Washington, for a 
neurosurgical consultation to determine if any cause could be 
determined for the patient's shoulder pain. 
On August 30, 1991, Robert D. Martz, M.D., a neurosurgeon in 
Spokane, examined the patient. His Clinical examination 
disclosed complete range of motion of the cervical spine, normal 
motor testing for the upper extremities, as well as the lower 
extremities. Sensation was diminished to pinprick in the fourth 
and fifth fingers on the left. Clinical diagnosis was 
"Postoperative left shoulder pain." Dr. Martz suggested x-rays, 
including flexion/extension cervical spine films to ensure that 
the fusion was solid and that the pain that she was experiencing 
was not due to "pseudarthrosis." He also suggested that an 
additional EMG study be done to exclude thoracic outlet syndrome. 
Cervical spine x-rays performed on August 30, 1991, as 
interpreted by Roger P. Blair, M.D., and David P. Thorne, M.D., 
of Northwest Imaging, Spokane, Washington, disclosed "1. 
Anterior fusion at C6-7 with approximately 2.5 mm of posterior 
subluxation of C6 on C7 in the neutral and extension views. 
There is improved alignment of flexion suggesting a degree of 
instability. 2. Evidence of prior fusion at C4-5 which is 
stable. 3. Posterior subluxation of C5 on C6 which improves on 
extension. 
Physical therapy was continued throughout this time including 
through September 1991. 
On September 20, 1991, Dr. Martz indicated in a letter to Dr. 
French that physical therapy should be continued. If improvement 
did not occur, then consideration should be given to a I'C7 nerve 
block." If that studied proved to be positive, then the patient 
might be a candidate for foraminotomy and posterior fusion, or 
perhaps repeat of the anterior fusion at C6-7. 
The patient underwent the nerve block on October 25, 1991. The 
study was performed by Daniel K. Larson, M.D. The patient noted 
that the nerve block did produce some benefit, and the clinical 
impression by Dr. Larson was: cqProbable C7 nerve root irritation 
as etiology for left shoulder and arm pain." 
Dr. Martz, on October 29, 1991, felt that he was not convinced 
that a repeat fusion of C6-7 would be of benefit. He did feel 
that a thoracic outlet study should be performed. 
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An elevated arm stress test was performed on November 25, 1991, 
at Vascular Diagnostic Laboratory in Spokane, Washington. This 
study disclosed: "This study suggestive of significant plexus 
compression on the left with arterial compression also noted with 
hyper-extension. This is suggestive of Thoracic outlet 
syndrome." The interpreting physician's name cannot be 
determined from this report. 
On December 5, 1991, Dr. Martz reviewed this study and felt that 
further treatment was indicated and recommended a referral to a 
vascular surgeon, Richard Kleaveland, M.D. 
On January 2, 1992, the patient was seen by David Ashbaugh, M.D., 
a thoracic surgeon. Dr. Ashbaugh did not feel that additional 
surgery would be of benefit, and suggested that her condition was 
fixed and stable. If further treatment was indicated, he felt 
that a multidisciplinary pain clinic would be the next 
appropriate step. 
On February 26, 1992, Dr. Martz reiterated his opinion that the 
patient should be referred to see Dr. Kleaveland. 
Follow-up notes with Dr. French are noted for March 23, 1992, and 
September 4 ,  1992. 
The patient was seen by Dr. Richard Kleaveland on March 29, 1992. 
Dr. Kleaveland's examination disclosed obliteration of pulses 
with abduction and external rotation. With the elevated arm 
stress test, the patient developed discomfort in the upper arm, 
and after holding the position for approximately one minute, was 
unable to continue, and brought h@r arms in a neutral position. 
Grip strength was felt to be satisfactory. Range of motion was 
limited because of fusion. No supraclavicular tenderness over 
the brachial plexus was present. Examination of the carotids was 
normal. Dr. Kleaveland diagnosed thoracic outlet syndrome, left, 
and suggested a resection of the first rib and scalenotomy for 
treatment of this condition. 
The patient did not undergo surgery for the thoracic outlet 
syndrome. 
On July 14, 1992, Dr. Ashbaugh suggested a 20-percent disability 
based on the pain that the patient developed with heavy use of 
the left arm. He also felt that this was, at least in part, a 
chronic pain syndrome. 
On August 5, 1992, Dr. Katovich suggested that a computerized 
tomography (CT) scan of the lower back was indicated for further 
evaluation. 
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On August 17, 1992, Dr. Ashbaugh, in a letter to Idaho Industrial 
Commission, stated that the patient's major problem was chronic 
pain originating from the neck injury. The thoracic outlet 
syndrome was probably not related to the injury and, because of 
pain, he felt that the patient had a weakness in regard to 
repetitive motions of the upper extremity. He Went on to state 
that he found it difficult to assign a disability rating based 
upon Idaho law. 
PRESENT COMPLAINTS: 
The patient's condition at present includes pain located 
primarily in the lower back. There is minimal, if any, pain 
affecting the neck. The neck pain only occurs when she moves her 
neck. She also experiences intermittent numbness and paresthes- 
ias of the left arm, and these symptoms occur when she elevates 
the arm or abducts the arm. In neutral position, she is free of 
these symptoms. 
Overall, the patient's condition has remained unchanged essen- 
tially since the immediate postoperative period. 
The patient does note some subjective weakness of the left hand 
and arm. 
There is no history of bowel or bladder incontinence. Coughing, 
sneezing, or straining have no specific relationship to the 
patient's symptoms. 
The patient is not receiving any specific treatment for her 
condition. The patient is not receiving any specific medications 
for this condition. 
CHART REVIEW: 
The chart was reviewed, and no additional pertinent information 
was noted besides that which has been incorporated into this 
report. 
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY: 
Past and recent illnesses: None of significance. 
Surgeries: Right knee surgery in 1978. She also underwent a 
cholecystectomy in 1978. A tracheostomy was performed in 19-71 
for treatment of smoke inhalation. A cesarean section Was 
performed in 1981. 
Allergies: The patient has had adverse effects with the use of 
Keflex, penicillin, and various analgesics. 
REVIm OF sy-: 
HEENT: Negative. 
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Cardiocirculatory: Negative. 
Pulmonary: Negative. 
GI: Negative. 
GU: Negative. 
Neuropsychiatric: Negative. 
SOCIAL AND FAMILY HISTORY: 
The information in the social and Family History section of this 
report was obtained from a form completed by Patsy Wernecke on 
the date of this examination, as well as from her interview with 
the panel doctors. 
The patient is married. She has completed 12 years of education. 
There is no history of tobacco consumption at present. The 
patient does occasionally consume beer. 
The patient has no history of military service. 
There is a family history of heart disease. Her father died at 
age 61 from heart disease. Her mother died at age 51 also from 
heart disease. The patient states that she does not exercise on 
a regular basis. 
Work history: The patient had been employed as a certified 
nurse's assistant (CNA) for Valley Vista Care Center for four 
months at the time of her injury. She is not currently working. 
PHYSICAL -ATION: 
The patient is a wleasant, alert, cooperative woman. Height 5' 
1 ll. - Weight 124 pounds. 
- 
Vital Signs: Blood pressure 118/80. Pulse 68 and regular. 
The patient is noted to be right-handed. 
HEENT: Normal. 
Lungs: Clear to auscultation. 
Heart: Normal first and second heart sounds. No murmurs Or 
gallops are present. 
Abdomen: Soft and nontender. No masses are palpable. 
Genitalia/Rectal: Not performed. 
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scars: She has a 4-centimeter transverse scar present over the 
anterior cervical region. A 6-centimeter right knee scar is 
present. 
Peripheral pulses: Full and symmetric. 
ORTHOPEDICMEnROLOGIC EXAMINATION: 
En bloc truncal rotation does not elicit any symptoms. There is 
pain elicited in the neck on minimal axial ioading at the vertex. 
There is no visible or palpable muscle spasm. The patient's 
posture is good. There is equal weight bearing. There is no 
abnormal kyphosis, lordosis or scoliosis. 
There is a pain to very superficial palpation of the cervical 
upper dorsal structures. There is pain elicited on deep 
palpation of the lumbosacral region. 
Range of motion findings for the back reveal flexion to 45 
degrees, extension to 20 degrees, and lateral flexion to 35 
degrees bilaterally. Thoracic spine rotation is to 20 degrees 
bilaterally. 
Range of motion findings for the neck reveal flexion to 20 
degrees, extension to 30 degrees and lateral flexion to 15 
degrees right and 10 degrees left. Rotation is to 30 degrees on 
the right and to 20 degrees on the left. 
Thoracic spine rotation is to 20 degrees bilaterally. 
The gait is normal. There is normal heel and toe walking. 
Tandem Romberg is normal. Squatting is performed at two-thirds 
normal. 
Hip joint range of motion is n'onnal bilaterally. 
Shoulder range of motion is normal bilaterally. 
Straight leg raising is to 90 degrees both sitting and supine 
bilaterally. Pain does not increase with dorsiflexion or plantar 
flexion bilaterally. Fabere's is negative bilaterally. 
Leg lengths are symmetric. Thigh circumferences are 43 
centimeters on the right and 44 centimeters on the left. Calf 
circumferences are 33 centimeters on'the right and 33 centimeters 
on the left. Arm circumferences are 29 centimeters on the right 
and 27.5 centimeters on the left. Forearm circumferences are 26 
centimeters on the right and 25.5 centimeters on the left. 
In terms of mental status, the patient is alert and oriented. 
Cognitive functions are intact. Affect is appropriate. Cranial 
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nerves I1 through X I 1  are within normal limits including 
funduscopic examination. 
Motor system examination reveals normal muscle mass, tone and 
strength throughout. No abnormal movements are present. 
Sensory examination reveals diminished pinprick, light touch, and 
temperature over the ulnar border of the left hand. Otherwise 
all areas are normal in terms of sensation, 
There is no limb or truncal ataxia present. 
The muscle stretch reflexes are graded 2+ for the biceps, 
triceps, brachioradialis, knees and ankles bilaterally. Babinski 
signs are not present. There is no clonus, spasticity or visible 
atrophy present. 
Tinelrs sign is not present at the wrists or elbows bilaterally. 
Adsonrs maneuver does not elicit symptoms bilaterally. Phalenls 
maneuver elicits paresthesias of the fifth finger, left hand. 
There is a bruit noted in the left supraclavicular fossa when the 
left arm is abducted and elevated. 
DIAGNOSIS: 
1) Status post anterior cervical fusion with right 
iliac crest graft, C5-6 ,  C6-7 ,  secondary to the 
industrial injury of JUne 28, 1990. 
2) Probable left thoracic outlet syndrome, unrelat- 
ed to the industrial injury of June 28, 1990. 
3) Chronic pain behavior. 
PECOMKENDATXONS AND DISCUfSXON: 
It is the opinion of this panel that the patient's objective 
findings include only the limitation of cervical range of motion 
as determined by physical examination. 
The panel does believe that the patient is capable of gainful 
employment on a reasonably continuous basis. We would suggest 
that restrictions include avoiding lifting over 30 pounds, as 
reflected by the industrially related injury. She should avoid 
working overhead as a result of the nonindustrial condition 
(probable left thoracic outlet syndrome). The restrictions as 
imposed by the industrially related condition are permanent in 
nature. 
The panel believes that the patient's industrially related 
condition is medically fixed and stable and no further active 
treatment measures will alter the natural history of this 
condition. 
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The panel suggests that the patient's condition warrants a 
recommendation of 16-percent impairment of whole person based 
upon the objective findings of limitation of range of motion of 
the cervical spine. This estimate is based upon the AMA Guides 
to the Evaluations of Permanent Im~ainnent, third edition 
(revised), pages 88 to 90. 
END OF REPORT 
Hollis A. Mercer 
Idaho State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720 
(208) 334-2370 
Attorney for Defendants Valley Vista Care Corporation and State 
Insurance Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
vs . 
VALLEY VISTA CARE CORPORATION, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
) 
) IC NO. : 90-702141 
) 
1 SIF NO.: 90-01812 
) 
) 
1 
1 LUMP SUM AGREEMENT 
) 
Surety, 
) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
In consideration of the premises, promises and covenants 
hereinafter set forth and subject to the approval of the Agreement 
by the Industrial Commission, the parties hereto enter into the 
following Lump Sum Agreement and request an order of the Commission 
discharging the Defendants from liability pursuant to Section 
72-404, Idaho Code. 
FIRST: The parties shall be designated herein as follows: 
PATSY WERNECKE is the Claimant herein and during all relevant 
times was an employee of VALLEY VISTA CARE CORPORATION hereinafter 
referred to as "Employer"; Employer was insured for its worker's 
compensation liability by STATE INSURANCE FUND, hereinafter 
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referred to as "Surety". The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of the State of 
Idaho, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, has the exclusive 
jurisdiction to hear, determine and make the appropriate award and 
order in this matter. 
SECOND: Claimant alleges that, on or about June 28, 1990 
while she was employed by said Employer, she suffered injuries to 
her back and neck while in the course and scope of her employment. 
At the time of said injury, Claimant was 38 years of age, married 
and had one child under the age of 18. Claimant worked 40 hours a 
week earning an average weekly wage of $119.41. Timely notice was 
given to the Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to 
the Idaho Worker's Compensation Act. 
THIRD: As will appear from the medical reports, Claimant was 
primarily treated by Graeme French, M.D. for C5-6, C6-7 herniated 
discs and by Dean Martz, M.D. for thoracic outlet syndrome. On 1- 
24-91 Dr. French performed C5-6, C6-7 fusion with iliac crest 
graft . 
On 4-29-92 Claimant was evaluated by David Ashbaugh, M.D. at 
the request of the Surety. Dr. Ashbaugh diagnosed thoracic outlet 
syndrome and chronic pain syndrome. Dr. Ashbaugh recommended a 
multi-disciplinary pain clinic. Dr. Ashbaugh estimated Claimant 
had a 20% disability. 
On 10-13-92 claimant was evaluated by a panel of physicians 
through OMAC at the request of the Surety. The panel found 
Claimant had sustained a 16% whole person permanent partial 
impairment as a result of her 6-28-90 injury. 
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FOURTH: The Employer and Surety have paid Claimant the 
following benefits: 
MEDICAL 
Doctors 
J.R. Katovich, M.D. 
J.T. Giesen, M.D. 
Palouse orthopedic & Fracture Clinic 
H. Graeme French, M.D. 
M.R. Kleaveland, M.D. 
OMAC 
St. Joe Valley Clinic 
Ernest Fokes, M.D. 
Merle Janes, M.D. 
Neurosurgery Associates 
General Surgery 
university of Washington Physicians 
Benewah Community Hospital 
Kootenai Medical Center 
Pullman Memorial Hospital 
Gritman Memorial Hospital 
Sacred Heart Medical Center 
Harborview Medical Center 
Physical Therapy 
Benewah Community Hospital 
Mileaae 
Reimburse Claimant 
Miscellaneous 
Jack's Pharmacy 
Radiology ~ssociates of N. Idaho 
North Idaho Imaging Center 
Reimburse claimant 
Pathology Associates of Spokane 
Gress Anesthesia Service 
Marketime Drug 
Gritman Radiology Consultants 
Medical Services Co. 
Spokane ~iagnostic Radiology 
Vascular Diagnostic Lab 
Inland Imaging 
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United Parcel Service 
Ken's Stationary 
North Idaho Consulting 
Total ~edical paid to date: $ 28,873.22 
Claimant agrees to allow Surety to provide to the Commission any 
medical records reasonably necessary to effectuate the terms of 
this Agreement. 
FIFTH: There are genuine and substantial disputes and 
differences between the parties as to the degree, if any, of 
Claimant's impairment and disability, the need for retraining 
benefits and the need for future medical benefits. The parties, 
however, wish to settle their differences on a full and final basis 
advising the Commission that it is in the best interests of the 
parties to do so. Therefore, in an effort to settle this disputed 
matter, the Surety tenders to the Claimant and the Claimant accepts 
the sum of $30,000.00 in full and final settlement as provided by 
Idaho Code Section 72-404.  
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT THE CLAIMANT 
AGREES TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS NOT LISTED IN THE 
FOURTH PARAGRAPH OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYER AND SURETY WILL 
NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR, NOR DO THEY ASSUME LIABILITY FOR, ANY OTHER 
MEDICAL BILLS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SAID LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT SHALL BE 
APPORTIONED AS FOLLOWS: 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
Total Temporary Disabilitv Benefits 
6-29-90 through 9-23-90 
12 weeks, 3 days at $107.47 
a week $ 1 , 0 3 5 . 6 8  
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10-7-90 through 12-31-90 
12 weeks, 2 days at $107.47 
a week $ 1,320.33 
1-1-91 through 7-10-91 
27 weeks, 2 days at $113.37 
a week $ 3,093.37 
7-11-91 through 12-31-91 
24 weeks, 6 days at $202.96 
a week $ 5,045.00 
1-1-92 through 6-18-92 
24 weeks, 2 days at $212.40 
a week $ 5,158.27 
TOTAL DUE 
Temworary Partial Disability Benefits 
Retrainina Benefits 
Permanent Partial Imwairment 
16% whole person at 80 weeks 
at $183.70 a week $ 14,696.00 
TOTAL DUE 
(Total paid by Surety: $15,920.55. 
Overpayment waived.) 
Future Medical Benefits $ 4,996.75 
Unau~ortioned Disuuted 
Imwairment and Additional 
Disabilitv Benefits at 24.5% 
whole werson at 122.5 weeks 
at $183.70 a week $ 22,503.25 
In consideration for this Lump 
Sum Aareement uursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 72-404. 
waiver of riaht of awueal. 
waiver of riqht of reconsid- 
eration, waiver of riqht of 
modification $ 2,500.00 
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Less TTD previously paid $ 15,952.65 
Less TPD previously paid $ -0- 
Less Retraining paid $ -0- 
Less PPI previously paid $ 14,696.00 
Less LSS advance paid $ -0- 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT 
A. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS 
B. Costs taken prior to LSS 
C. Additional attorney fees to be 
- taken from LSS 
D. Additional costs to be taken 
from LSS 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS TO 
BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider and amounts.) 
E. Total of Outstanding medicals $ 0.00 
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
(Subtract Lines C & D relating $ 22,145.51 
to attorney fees, and Line E 
relating to outstanding medicals, 
from the total amount due 
claimant of this LSS) 
SIXTH: The parties advise the Commission that they believe 
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that it is in their best interest that this disputed matter be 
settled as herein set forth. 
The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of the 
temporary disability and permanent partial disability and medical 
and related expenses in this matter are uncertain and may be 
continuing or progressive and may substantially exceed those 
hereinabove set forth, and the above shall not limit the scope of 
this Agreement or the Order of Discharge entered by the Commission 
pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights 
and claims to all permanent and temporary disability benefits, all 
impairment benefits and all medical and related benefits whether or 
not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the 
parties. 
The Claimant does agree to indemnify, defend and hold 
Defendants harmless from and against any further claim or loss of 
any and every kind arising out of or related to the said alleged 
accident, and any resultant losses, damages or injuries, including 
without limit, any claim respecting past or future hospital, 
medical or like expenses. 
SEVENTH: The claimant acknowledges and agrees that she has 
carefully read this instrument in its entirety and has been fully 
advised regarding the contents of this Agreement by her counsel, 
that Claimant understands its contents and has signed same knowing 
that the payment Forever concludes, settles and fully disposes of 
any and all claims of any kind and nature and character that she 
now has or may have individually against Employer and Surety on 
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concluded and forever discharged and that they may be dismissed 
with prejudice by reason hereof, subject only to the Commission's 
order and approval. 
Pursuant to IAR 72-803.1, a memorandum from Claimant's counsel 
accompanies this Agreement setting forth the required information 
regarding Claimant's attorney's fees. 
EIGHTH: Upon the  omm mission's order approving this Agreement 
and subject to the payment of $30,000.00, the balance due Claimant, 
the Employer and Surety shall be discharged and released of and 
from any and all liability on account of the above-described 
accidents and injuries. 
DATED this day of , 1994. 
1 
PATSY HERNECKE 
Claimant 
WESTBERG \ \ 
@torney for ~laimanw 
MERLE D. PARSLEY 
Manager, State Insurance Fund 
JULIE COOPER 
Claims Manager, State Insurance 
Fund 
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HOLLIS A .  MERCER 
Attorney for Employer, Val ley  V i s t a  
Care Corpora t ion ,  and Sure ty ,  Idaho 
S t a t e  Insurance  Fund. 
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Upon the foregoing and good cause appearing and the Industrial 
commission being fully advised and having determined that it is for 
the best interests of the parties that the liability of the 
Employer and Surety and the Fund be discharged in whole by the 
payment of the Lump Sum Agreement as provided therein, NOW 
THEREFORE: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lump Sum Agreement be and it 
hereby is approved as provided by Section 72-404 Idaho Code, and 
that the above-entitled proceedings are dismissed with prejudice 
and the Employer, Valley Vista Care Corporation, and the Surety, 
are discharged and released of and from any and all liability on 
account of the above-entitled injuries. 
DATED : 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
BY 
CHAIRMAN 
BY 
COMMISSIONER 
BY 
COMMISSIONER 
ATTEST: 
ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
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QUANE, SMITH, HOWARD & HULL 
700 Ironwood Drive, Suite 301 
P. 0. Box 1758 
Coeur dtAlene, Idaho 83816-1758 
Telephone: 664-9281 
Attorneys for Defendant ISIF 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
VS . 
VALLEY VISTA CARE 
CORPORATION, 
Employer, 
and 
I.C. 90-702141 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, I 
Surety, I 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. I 
IN CONSIDERATION of the premises and promises and 
covenants hereinafter set forth, and subject to the above-entitled 
Commission~s Approval and Order of Discharge pursuant thereto, the 
above-entitled parties hereby stipulate and agree as follows: 
FIRST: As hereinafter referred to, the parties shall be 
designated as follows: 
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Patsy Wernecke as Claimant, Industrial Special Indemnity 
Fund as the Fund, and the Industrial Commission of the State of 
Idaho as the Commission. 
SECOND: On June 28,  1990, Claimant was employed as a 
nurse's aide by Valley Vista Care Corporation, and on the same 
date, Claimant allegedly incurred injuries resulting from an 
industrial accident arising out of and in the course of employment 
with Valley Vista Care Corporation. These injuries include 
herniated disc at C5-6 and C6-7 which resulted in a two level 
anterior fusion on January 24, 1991. 
THIRD: Claimant contends, and the Fund denies, that 
Claimant is totally and permanently disabled and unable to work and 
that the Fund is liable for a portion of Claimant's disability due 
to preexisting conditions. 
FOURTH: It is the contention of the Fund that there are 
disputes concerning: (1) whether Claimant suffered injuries as a 
result of an accident arising out of and in the course of employ- 
ment on June 28, 1990; (2) whether Claimant is totally and 
permanently disabled; (3) whether Claimant has a pre-existing 
permanent physical impairment within the meaning of Section 72-332 
Idaho Code; (4) if Claimant has a pre-existing physical impairment, 
whether said pre-existing impairment was manifest and constituted 
a hindrance or obstacle to Claimant obtaining employment; (5) 
whether in the event Claimant is totally and permanently disabled, 
Claimant has pre-existing impairments within the meaning of section 
72-332, Idaho Code, which contributed to said disability; (6) the 
extent of apportionment of liability for benefits between ~efendant 
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employer/surety and the Fund pursuant to Section 72-332, Idaho 
Code, in the event liability is assessed against the Fund. 
The parties hereto acknowledge that there are serious 
questions and, therefore, disputes concerning the above issues. 
~t 
is further acknowledged that this lump sum settlement is a 
compromise settlement of said issues as well as all other issues 
whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated 
by the parties. 
Claimant has heretofore invoked the jurisdiction of the 
Commission by duly serving the Fund with appropriate pleadings, the 
timeliness and sufficiency as to form of said filings being 
conceded by the Fund. 
In consideration of this agreement, all parties stipulate 
that the Commission shall, on and by approval hereof, be deemed to 
adjudicate the liability of the Fund as provided by the Workers1 
Compensation Laws of Idaho. 
FIFTH: Claimant was born o  At the time 
of the alleged accident, Claimant was a resident of Fernwood, 
Idaho. Claimant was earning $4.51 per hour as a nurse's aide. 
Claimant is currently unemployedand resides in Fernwood, Idaho. 
SIXTH: Following the 1990 accident, Claimant was treated 
by various physicians, whose reports are on file with the Commis- 
sion. Claimant was examined by Dr. David Ashbaugh at the request 
of the State Insurance Fund on April 28, 1992. Dr. Ashbaugh 
concluded that Claimant suffered a 20% permanent impairment rating 
based upon chronic pain as a result of her industrial injury. On 
October 13, 1992 Claimant was also examined by a panel of physi- 
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cians at the request of the State Insurance Fund. The panel 
concluded that Claimant was capable of gainful employment on a 
reasonably continuous basis with restrictions of no lifting over 
thirty pounds or working overhead. The panel concluded that 
Claimant was stable and had an impairment rating of 16% of the 
whole person. Copies of these reports are attached. 
SEVENTH: It is understood and agreed by and between the 
parties hereto that the lump sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be 
paid to Claimant by the Fund is in consideration for and in payment 
of any and all claims that Claimant may now or hereafter have, 
including but not limited to every claim of whatever nature or kind 
for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary 
disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and all 
other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter make for benefits 
against the Fund under the Workers1 Compensation Laws of the State 
of Idaho. This is the case whether or not the full extent of 
Claimant's damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now 
known or foreseen, and regardless. of whether the Claimant shall 
ever again injure herself in another or future accident, or suffer 
any disease which would arguably cause the Fund to be liable for 
additional claims or benefits under the laws of the State of Idaho. 
Acceptance of this agreement by the Claimant according to the terms 
and conditions stated herein, shall fully and completely discharge 
the Fund from liability from any claims forever, regardless of 
whether such claims arise from the accident which is the subject of 
this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, 
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disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafter 
arising. 
EIGHTH: In making this lump sum agreement and settle- 
ment, all parties acknowledge and agree that the Fund does not 
admit the allegations of. Claimant, the same being solely for the 
purpose of adjudication and settlement of a doubtful and disputed 
claim. 
NINTH: It is in the best interests of justice of the 
parties hereto that the above-entitled claim be fully, finally and 
forever settled, satisfied and discharged upon a lump sum payment 
by the Fund to Claimant in the amount of $6,500.00 within a 
reasonable time following entry of Order of Discharge and approval 
hereof by the Commission. 
TOTAL PERHANEEIT 
DISABIL3:TY ,BENEBITS : $6,500.00 
Less attorney's fees and 
costs payable by claimant 
(from proceeds of lump sum 
settlement) $ 1,500.00 
RECOVERY TO CLAIMANT: $5,000.00 
TENTH: Claimant is represented herein and has been 
counseled by James Westberg of Moscow, Idaho, whose name shall be 
included as a payee on the respective settlement drafts to be 
delivered to said attorney. by the Fund. Attached as "Addendum A" 
is an accounting from Claimant's attorney, James Westberg, Setting 
forth the information currently required by the rndustrial 
Commission pursuant to the Commission's administrative rulings 
under Section 72-803, Idaho Code. 
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ELEVENTH: Upon Commission order approving this agreement 
and excepting only payment of said consideration by the Fund, the 
Fund shall be fully, finally and forever discharged and released of 
and from any and all liability on account of the above Claimant. 
TWELFTH: The terms of this agreement shall be binding 
upon all of the above-parties, their heirs, representatives, 
successors and assigns. 
THIRTEENTH: The parties waive findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and the right of appeal or to reopen these 
proceedings as part of the consideration of and for this agreement. 
The parties hereto specifically and expressly agree, as 
part of the consideration herein, that the parties waive the right 
to reconsideration of an award otherwise provided under the 
worker's compensation laws of Idaho, Section 72-718, Idaho Code. 
FOURTEENTH: This agreement is made at Claimant's request 
and is the acceptance of offer by the Fund. By this instrument, 
Claimant requests Commission approval hereof and Order of Discharge 
pursuant hereto; and the Fund joins in said petition and stipulates 
that it shall be granted. Claimant acknowledges that he has 
carefully read this agreement and legal instrument in its entirety, 
understands its contents and has executed the same knowing that 
this agreement forever concludes and fully and finally disposes of 
any and all claims of every kind and character he has or may have 
against the Fund, and that these proceedings are concluded and 
forever closed by reason hereof, subject only to  omm mission 
approval and order, as aforesaid. 
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FIFTEENTH: ~ l l  portions of this instrument constitute 
binding covenants of the parties, and no portion is a mere recital. 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) ss. 
county of 1 
On this day of February, 1994, before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally 
appeared PATSY WERNECKE, known to me to be the person whose name is 
subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and 
affixed my official seal, the day and year first above written. 
- 
(SEAL) 
APPROVED: 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
EMNITY FUND, 
Def endan f l  
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ORDER OF APPROVAL AND OF DISCHARGE 
UPON LUMP SUM PAYMENT 
The foregoing stipulation agreement and petition having 
duly and regularly come before this Commission and appearing that 
the interests of justice and of the Claimant, Patsy Wernecke, are 
and will be served by approving said agreement and granting the 
order of Discharge as prayed for, 
NOW, THEREFORE, said foregoing stipulation and agreement 
shall be, and the same hereby is, APPROVED; and further, 
said petition shall be and hereby is GRANTED, and the 
above-entitled proceedings against the Fund are DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE. 
DATED this 2 day of Febryary, 1994. 
Assistant Secretary 
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Kenneth L. Mallea 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
78 S.W. 5" Avenue, Suite 1 
P.O. Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 d ' / f Z  
Telephone: (208) 888-2790 
Fax: (208) 888-2789 
/' 
Idaho State Bar No. 2397 
Attorney for Defendant State of Idaho 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
VS. 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 4 1, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR DECLARATORY 
RULING 
COMES NOW DEFENDANT, State of Idaho, Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
("ISIF"), by and through its counsel of record, Kenneth L. Mallea, of the firm Mallea 
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Law Offices, and submits the following Reply Memorandum in Support of its Petition for 
Declaratory Ruling. 
Claimant has opposed ISIF's Petition for Declaratory Ruling mainly on the basis 
of her belief that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue is invalid under Idaho's 
worker's compensation law. Initially, ISIF would note the irony of Claimant's counsel's 
position in this matter. Though counsel now argues vehemently that the Agreement was 
some type of nefarious attempt by the ISIF to avoid its obligations under Idaho law, it 
should be remembered that Claimant, through counsel, advanced the Agreement in 
question and advocated for its acceptance in front of the Commission in the earlier suit. 
Claimant received her consideration for the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and 
counsel took fees associated with the settlement. Certainly, Claimant was not forced to 
sign the agreement, was represented by counsel and was apprised of her rights and the 
full consequences of executing the settlement agreement. 
Now Claimant and her attorneys have decided, after having accepted the benefits 
of the settlement, that the Agreement was in error and that Claimant was prejudiced and 
denied rights to compensation by agreeing to a settlement to which her counsel advanced 
during the initial litigation in this matter. ISIF would contend that such a position is 
contrary to the general dictates of fairness and substantial justice that should exist in these 
types of proceedings. Moreover, the principles of good faith and finality of results is 
clearly violated when a party advocates for the illegality of their own agreements in an 
attempt to cure their own past mistakes or claim an advantage in future litigation. 
Claimant has not provided any substantial authority for the proposition that the 
Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at issue is invalid under Idaho law or that ISIF had no 
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authority to enter into it. However, beyond the issues of waiver, estoppel, claim or issue 
preclusion in this matter, the Commission should not reward the type of litigation strategy 
where a Claimant may accept the benefit of a settlement in connection with a worker's 
compensation claim and then later argue for its illegality in an attempt to find a way to be 
awarded further benefits to which they are not entitled. Otherwise, the policy of 
encouraging settlement of claims would be severely undermined, as parties would lack 
confidence in the finality of judgments based on Lump Sum Settlement Agreements and 
have legitimate concerns about never-ending litigation. 
A. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement at Issue is not Invalid under Idaho 
Code 5 72-318. 
Claimant first argues that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement is an invalid 
agreement to waive rights to compensation under LC. 5 72-318(2). That statute provides 
that "[nlo agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this Act 
shall be valid." LC. § 72-318(2). Claimant has not cited any case law in Idaho 
interpreting the statute to mean that a lump sum settlement agreement which provides 
that payment is being made in consideration for all claims the claimant may also make in 
the future against the ISIF is unlawful under the statute. 
Claimant attempts to support her position by quoting language from a recent 
Idaho Supreme Court case where the Court found that a Claimant's voluntary dismissal 
of their worker's compensation claim with prejudice did not constitute a waiver to rights 
of compensation under the act. See Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 11 P.3d 92 
(2005). Certainly, the Court noted in dicta that the stipulation at issue did not relieve the 
employer for all injuries the worker might suffer while employed at Simplot. Id. 
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However, the court did not state that an agreement, such as the one disputed in this case, 
would be presumptively violative of § 72-318 and the facts of this case differ in material 
respects even if Emery did have some application. 
First, ISIF would note that the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly stated that 3 72- 
318 QI& prohibits an agreement by an employee to relieve an employer of an obligation 
that the emvlover has because of the workers' compensation laws. See Osick v. Public 
Employee Ret. Sys., 122 Idaho 457,461,835 P.2d 1268, 1272 (1992); see also Burdick v. 
Thornton, 109 Idaho 869,712 P.2d 570 (1985). From all of the case law interpreting LC. 
$72-318, it appears clear that the statute is intended to prevent emulovers from advancing 
agreements with their employees, outside of the litigation process or not relating to an 
actual compensation claim, that may limit an employee's rights under the Worker's 
Compensation Act. ISIF is not an empIoyer and the statute does not address agreements 
between a claimant and ISIF. More importantly, as Emery and the other cases above 
make clear, the statute is not intended to regulate judgments made in connection with a 
settlement agreement in a litigation setting. 
Indeed, in this case Claimant is not even technically attacking the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement, but the earlier judgment itself. As Idaho Code 3 72-71 1 clearly 
provides, an agreement approved by the Commission "shall for all purposes be an award 
by the commission." See also Drake v. State, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.3d 397 (1996) (An 
approved agreement constitutes a final decision of the Commission). Thus, the issue in 
this case is not an employee agreement waiving rights to compensation, but whether 
Claimant may reopen the judgment of the Commission. When the Commission approved 
the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, the Agreement merged into the judgment and the 
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Agreement became the decision of the Commission on the matter. If Claimant had any 
claim of prejudice or error, her remedy was to timely move to have the Commission 
reconsider the judgment, i.e., under Idaho Code $72-718, and/or use of applicable appeal 
procedures. However, Claimant may not now seek to re-open the Commission's 
decision. More importantly, I.C. $ 72-318 has no application to the facts or procedural 
posture of this case. 
B. Claimant's Argument that She was not Compensated for Total and 
Permanent Disability has no Import in this Proceeding. 
Claimant has also asserted that the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement merely 
represented a de minimus amount in consideration of a waiver of future claims, a devise 
that is in violation of the ISIF's obligation under Idaho Code $ 72-332(1) to compensate a 
permanently and totally disabled claimant for the remainder of their income benefits to 
which they are entitled out of the Industrial Special Indemnity Account. This argument is 
merely a red herring in this proceeding and has no application to the analysis of whether 
Claimant may attack the earlier judgment based on the Lump Sum Settlement 
Agreement. 
The ISIF's responsibility to compensate a claimant under $ 72-332 is contingent 
upon the Claimant providing proof that they are permanently and totally disabled. See 
Garcia v. J.X. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966,772 P.2d 173 (1989). In the initial proceeding 
in this matter, the Claimant attempted to prove total disability and the ISIF opposed that 
classification. Instead of both sides presenting their proof to the Commission on the 
matter, the parties agreed to settle the claim. Thus, Claimant was compensated for her 
claim of total disability. Under Idaho Code $ 72-234, ISIF's manager is granted the 
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power to "make agreements, subject to the approval of the Industrial Commission, for 
compensation of injuries.. ." 
The fact that Claimant now feels that the amount she received in the settlement 
did not adequately compensate her for her claim of total disability is immaterial to the 
current analysis. ISIF has the statutory right to enter into agreements with claimants in 
regards to their disability claims and the Commission approved the agreement in regards 
to Claimant, which became a final judgment when entered. Therefore, ISIF has not 
avoided any statutory mandate to compensate claimants who are found to be totally 
disabled. Claimant was never found to be totally disabled and accepted settlement of her 
disability claim in a manner that is consistent with dictates of the Worker's 
Compensation Act. 
C. ISIF May Settle CIaims Where the Claimant's Status as Totally Disabled 
is Disputed. 
Claimant's next argument that ISIF is not legally entitled to enter into agreements 
with claimants settling claims of permanent disability where ISIF denies liability for total 
disability payments is somewhat confusing and not in line with controlling law. Once 
again, Idaho Code 5 72-324 provides authority for ISIF to enter into agreements with 
Commission approval to resolve claims of an injured worker claiming total disability. 
Though Claimant appears to argue that a compensation agreement under Idaho Code § 
72-1 11 may only be entered into between employers and an afflicted employee, such is 
contrary to established precedent. See, e.g., Drake v. State, 128 Idaho 880, 920 P.2d 397 
(1996) (any liable party and an injured employee are permitted to enter into a settlement 
with regard to compensation, but the agreement must be approved by the Commission). 
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Claimant's argument would essentially entail the ISIF being prevented from ever 
entering into any agreement with a claimant in order to discharge its liability. Clearly, 
such a result is not mandated by the Act or any provision of Idaho law. Once again, 
Claimant also makes the unsupported and bare assertion here that the terms of the 
Agreement at issue did not conform to the provisions of law and, therefore, that the ISIF 
was not lawfully entitled to enter into the Agreement at issue. Of course, Claimant 
completely ignores the fact that the Commission has already approved the Agreement 
and, therefore, there should be a presumption that the Agreement was in accordance with 
the provisions of the Worker's Compensation Act. This also demonstrates that 
Claimant's complaint is really with the Commission's earlier judgment, not with the 
Agreement itself. It should further be noted that Claimant did not take issue with any of 
the case law ISIF cited in its earlier briefing in this matter evidencing that courts around 
the country have consistently allowed a claimant to properly release and waive future 
workman's compensation claims against a defendant in the course of a settlement 
agreement. 
However, Claimant also misses the entire purpose for including a provision 
preventing a claimant from asserting future claims of total disability in a compensation 
agreement. Unlike a standard worker injury claim, a claim for total permanent disability 
by its very nature is a conclusive claim. One cannot continue to become permanently 
disabled, the way they can continue to be injured in a work-related injury. By making a 
total disability claim, a claimant is not merely seeking benefits because of one 
occurrence, by which the claimant may return to work in some manner. The claimant is 
arguing that they are totally disabled, a claim that cannot, by its very nature, be raised 
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multiple times. 
Certainly, Claimant may have a reasonable argument here if an employer 
attempted to forge an agreement relieving itself of hture liability as to a work-related 
accident that had not yet occurred. However, a person who is asserting that they are 
totally disabled is asserting that they are forever totally disabled. They cannot reasonably 
accept benefits on a total disability claim and then continue to assert future claims of total 
disability. Otherwise, they should have never accepted benefits for total disability in the 
first place, as they were able to return to work and allegedly suffer another "totally 
disabling injury." 
In this case, Claimant accepted payment from ISIF under the Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement in regards to a claim of total disability. It makes perfect sense that 
ISIF, as part of that Agreement, would want to prevent Claimant from asserting future 
claims for total disability when payment had already been made under such a claim. It 
makes little sense that one worker should be able to gain benefits on a number of 
occasions for claiming total disability. ISIF would have little incentive to settle disputed 
total disability claims if the Claimant could continue to assert total disability claims in the 
future. 
Claimant's contention that ISIF may only enter into agreements with a claimant 
whom the ISIF acknowledges is totally and permanently disabled and which agreement 
merely provided the method and structure for payment of benefits is completely 
unsupportable by Idaho statutory or case law. The ISIF may clearly enter into settlement 
agreements to discharge its obligations under 972-332. Moreover, those agreements 
would have little weight or purpose if an injured worker could accept payments for a 
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claim of total disability and then assert future claims of total disability. Therefore, the 
ISIF was fully within its rights to insert a provision in the Agreement limiting the 
Claimant's ability to assert such future claims. The Commission conclusively determined 
that such settlement was in accord with applicable law and within the best interests of the 
parties and approved the ~ ~ r e e m e n t . '  
D. Claimant has not Provided Adequate Authority to Prevent the 
Application of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in this Case. 
Claimant's only argument to the application of collateral estoppel in this case is 
that the ISIF's liability with regard to claimant's future injuries was not, and was never 
capable of, being decided in the prior action. However, Claimant once again confuses 
claims of future injury with claims of total disability. As noted earlier by ISIF, 
Commission approval of a lump sum agreement constitutes a final judgment on the 
merits of a claim. Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 
P.2d 1207 (1997). In this case, the Commission approved an Agreement, which merged 
into a final judgment, that Claimant was to receive the sum of $6,500 "in consideration 
for and in payment of any and all claims the claimant may now or hereafter have.. ." 
Therefore, the issue of whether Claimant could assert future claims of total disability 
against ISIF was actually and conclusively decided in the earlier suit. 
It is immaterial to the collateral estoppel analysis in this case that Claimant could 
' Claimant also references in her brief that the Commission had no authority to approve the Agreement at 
issue. Once again, the ISIF would argue that this attack is on the Commission's jurisdiction and authority to 
enter a final order in the initial suit between these parties which dismissed Claimant's claim and, therefore, 
is an attack on that earlierjudgment itself. As such, this particular issue has no weight in this proceeding, as 
any attack that the earlierjudgment was made in error is clearly time-barred. 
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have incurred a future injury which would involve a completely new set of facts. The 
issue to be estopped is not the future injury itself or the new set of facts or circumstances 
surrounding such injury. The issue is limited to Claimant's ability to raise new claims of 
total disability aeainst ISIF. There is little doubt that this issue was clearly decided in the 
earlier suit and, as argued above, Claimant's knowing and educated waiver of her right to 
bring future total disability claims against ISIF is not barred by Idaho Code 5 72-3 18(2). 
Thus, collateral estoppel applies to bar Claimant's current claim. 
Likewise, there is no merit to Claimant's contention that res judicata does not 
apply in this case since the Commission did not actually adjudicate her future injuries, 
since they had not yet occurred. Claimant continues to get hung up on whether the 
Commission in fact adjudicated her future injuries, when the issue is whether Claimant's 
right to receive compensation from ISIF for any future claim of total disability was 
actually adjudicated. Since the Agreement necessarily became part of the order and final 
judgment in the earlier case, the Commission conclusively adjudicated the issue, barring 
Claimant from asserting future claims of disability against the ISIF, regardless of whether 
she suffered a future injury in any work-related capacity. Res judicata also applies to bar 
the current claim against the ISIF. 
E. Judgment in Favor of the ISIF Would not Violate Public Policy 
ISIF would suggest that it is neither proper nor an act of good faith for Claimant 
to accept the benefits of the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement, understanding the 
meaning and import of the waiver at issue and then turn around and attempt to avoid the 
application of its provisions by now claiming that it violates the public policy of the State 
of Idaho. Certainly, Claimant did not feel the Agreement was violative of public policy 
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when she accepted the check from the ISIF. Claimant's counsel did not argue for the 
Commission to reject the Agreement because it was unlawful and against public policy 
when it accepted fees associated with the claim. Claimant's impassioned plea invoking 
public policy has only come out of the bag now that Claimant and counsel feel they erred 
in accepting the earlier Agreement and now seek to avoid the terms they agreed to in 
order to be provided further benefits and fees. 
ISIF would contend that part of the public policy of the Worker's Compensation 
laws is also the encouragement of the settlement of claims and the finality of judgments. 
Allowing Claimant to move forward with this claim against ISIF in the face of a clear and 
unambiguous agreement which by its terms prevents Claimant from asserting this action 
against ISIF both discourages the use of settlement in these types of proceedings and 
undercuts the finality of worker's compensation judgments. Therefore, the ISIF 
respectfully requests that the Commission uphold their earlier judgment and Agreement, 
barring Claimant from asserting liability against ISIF on a claim of total disability in this 
case. 
DATED this day of July, 2006. 
MALLEA LAW OFFICES 
I s-* / 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Attorney for DefendantIISIF 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 6'h day of July, 2006, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing document was served upon: 
Charles L. Graham 
c/o Landeck Westberg 
PO Box 9344 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Mark T. Monson 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
X X  by U.S. mail 
b y  hand delivery 
- by facsimile 
b y  overnight mail 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
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BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #04 1, Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
1 
1 NOTICE OF HEARING 
F I L E D  
1 AUG 1 0 2006 
1 
1 INDUSTRLAL COMMISSION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will he held in the above-entitled matter on 
OCTOBER 11,2006 at 9:00 a.m., Pacific Time, for one-half day, in the Industrial Commission 
field office, 11 11 Ironwood Drive, Suite A, City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of 
Idaho, on the following issues: 
1 .  Whether the construction, validity or applicability of a prior Lump Sum Agreement 
entered into between Petitioner and Claimant on the right of Claimant to maintain the current action 
against Petitioner is barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel; and, 
2. Whether Claimant's Complaint against ISIF should be dismissed. 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
* 
DATED this k2_ day of Ad ,2006. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
a 
I hereby certify that on the J!$- day of && ,2006 a true and correct copy of 
the NOTICE OF HEARING was served by Un@d States Certified Mail upon each of the 
following: 
CHARLES L GRAHAM 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW ID 83843-9344 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
and by regular United States mail upon: 
M&M COURT REPORTING SERVICES 
8 16 SHERMAN AVE #7 
COEUR D'ALENE ID 83814 
and courtesy copy to: 
THOMAS V MUNSON 
PO BOX 8266 
BOISE ID 83707-8266 
and by Email to: 
INDUSTRIAL, COMMISSION FO -- CDA 
cjh 
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KENNETH L. MALLEA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
- 
78 SW 5TH AVENUE, SUITE 1
POST OFFICE BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680-0857 
TELEPHONE 
(208) 888-2790 
FAX 
(208) 888-2789 
E-MAIL 
KLM@MALLEALAW.COM 
August 14,2006 
James F. Kile, Commissioner 
Industrial Commission 
P. 0. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Re: Wevnecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41, SIF, ISIF 
I.C. Case No. 15-000083 (03-5 15254) 
Dear Commissioner Kile: 2 
0 
C 
I have received the Notice of Hearing entered in this matter. qI z d I- 
I note that the hearing has been scheduled on the following issue: 8 - m  5 g 0 
"1. Whether the constructibn, validity or applicability o fa  prior EL? -3 WJ 
Lump Sum Agreement entered into between Petitioner and , .  9 
~laimaht onthkright of Cliimiit to maintain the cuirent action' 
against Petitioner is barred pursuant to the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel." 
Commissioner Kile, the ISIF has raised additional legal arguments in support of its 
Petition for Declaratory Ruling in this case beside that of collateral estoppel. Consequently, I do 
not think it is correct or appropriate to limit the first issue solely to application of the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel. 
Perhaps the Commission did not in any way mean to limit my Petition or argument solely 
to the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Nevertheless, I have had the Commission rule that only the 
designated issue will be heard, and I do certainly believe that other legal doctrines are presented 
- to the Commission in my Petition for Declaratory Ruling other than the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel. 
I therefore am respectfully requesting entry of an Amended Notice of Hearing or some 
other communication fromthe Commis'sion to coutrselandthe parties confirming that our 
Petition is not confined to applicitisn oft& dbctrine of collateral estoppel. ". , '.'. 
'lames F. Kile, Commissioner 
August 14,2006 
Page 2 
Thank you for your kind attention to this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
KLM/dm 
cc: Charles I.. Graham 
-ThQW&unson hzdn=rsn-) 
Verlene Wise 
KENNETH L. MALLEA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
78 SW STH AVENUE, SUITE 1 
POST OPFICE BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680-0857 
TELEPHONE 
(208) 888-2790 
FAX 
(208) 888-2789 
E-MAIL 
KLM@MALLEALAW.COM 
August 15,2006 
Mark T. Monson 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Re: Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41, SIF, ISIF 
LC. Case No. 15-000083 (03-5 15254) 
Dear Mark: 
Enclosed please find the Notice of Hearing entered in this matter as well as a copy of our 
response letter to the Commission. As you will note the Certificate of Service indicates that a 
courtesy copy was sent to Thomas V. Munson. Regrettably, instead of sending you a copy of 
our letter, we also sent the copy to Thomas Munson. 
If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Very truly yours, - :Z 
C7 s - 4  
c g3 
rn 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
KLMIdm 
Encs. 
cc: Commissioner James F. Kile 
Charles L. Graham 
Thomas V. Munson 
Verlene Wise 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
POBOX 83720 COMMISSIONERS 
Boise, ID837200041 Thonim E L!mba& Chauman J-F kle (208) 3346MM - FAX (208) 334-2321 R D ~aynsrd 
JAMES E. RISCH, GOVERNOR Mindy Montgomery. D i m ,  
August 15,2006 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
PO Box 857 
78 SW 5UL Ave., Ste. 1 
Meridian, ID 83680 
RE: Wamecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41 
and State Insurance Fund and Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity 
IC 15-000083 (03-515254) 
Dear Mr. Mallea: 
I have reviewed your recent letter of August 14 concerning the scope of the issues now 
scheduled for hearing on October 11,2006 in Coeur d'Alene. It would be most helpful if you 
could identify the additional issues presented in your petition, which you desire to present and 
argue at the hearing. Thank you for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
James F. Kile /Y- 
cc: Charles L. Graham 
PO Box 9344 
Moscow. ID 83843-9344 
Mqk Monson (w/enclosure) 
PO Box 8456 
Moscow. ID 83843-8456 
317 Main Street. Boise, ID 
Equal Opportunity Employer 
KENNETH L. MALLEA 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
~J&LLE;A OFFICES 
78 SW 5TH AVENUE, SUITE 1 
POST OFFICE BOX 857 
MEI~IDIAN ID 83680-0857 
TELEPHONE 
(208) 888-2790 
FAX 
August 16,2006 
James F. Kile, Commissioner 
Industrial Commission 
P. 0 .  Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 
Re: Wernecke v. St. Maries Joint School District No. 41, SIF, ZSIF 
I.C. Case No. 15-000083 (03-5 15254) 
Dear Commissioner Kile: 
Thank you for your letter of August 15,2006. My suggestion would be simply that the 
Notice of Hearing indicate that the Industrial Commission will hear oral argument on the 
pending Petition for Declaratory Ruling. This would allow me to argue all of the various factual 
and legal points which have been raised in the briefing and would likewise allow Mr. Graham an 
opportunity to rebut those arguments. 
If it is necessary to set forth the particular factual and legal arguments which we have 
raised, then I would simply rest upon the Petition, Supporting Affidavit, Memorandum in 
Support and my Reply Memorandum. 
It is my understanding that the purpose of the hearing on October 11,2006 is simply to 
permit counsel an opportunity to argue their respective positions and to allow the Commissioners 
an opportunity to ask questions regarding the pending Petition. It seems to me that the hearing is 
analogous to a District Court hearing on a pending Motion for Summary Judgment. If I am in 
someway misunderstanding your request, I apologize. If I can be of any further assistance to you 
or the Con~missioners, please let me know. 
KLMidm 
cc: Charles L. Graham 
Mark T. Monson 
Verlene Wise 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COhXiWSSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
v. 
ST. MARES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #041, Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
F I L E D  
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MNJSTRlAL COMMISSION 
1 
) AMENDED 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
OCTOBER 11,2006 at 9:00 a.m., Pacific Time, for one-half day, in the Industrial Commission 
field'office, 11 11 Ironwood Drive, Suite A, City of Coeur d'Alene, County of Kootenai, State of 
Idaho, on all relevant issues presented in the pleadings of the parties. 
w 
DATED this 1day of September, 2006. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
James F. Kile, mmissioner  
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on t h e z z y  of- ,2006 a true and correct copy of 
the AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING was lerved by United States Certified Mail uponeach 
of the following: 
CHARLES L GRAHAM 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW ID 83843-9344 
KENNElTH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
and courtesy copy to: 
THOMAS V MUNSON 
PO BOX 8266 
BOISE ID 83707-8266 
cjh 
AMENDED NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #04 1, Employer, 
and ) 
) 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, ) 
1 
and 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
Defendants. 1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the &?aY o , 2006 a true and correct 
courtesy copy of the AMENDED NOTICE OF ed by United States Mail 
upon: 
MARK MONSON 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843-8456 
cjh 
cc: CHARLES L GRAHAM - f f 3  4 50 5 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW ID 83843-9344 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 
Claimant, 
ST. MARLES JOINT SCHOOL 
DISTRICT #041, 
Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 
INDEMNITY FUND, 
Defendants. 
F ILED 
JAN I 9 2007 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ORDER ON PETITION 
FOR 
DECLARATORY RULING 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 18,2006, Defendant, State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund (ISD?), 
filed a Petition for Declaratory Ruling pursuant to Rule 15, Judicial Rules of Practice and 
Procedure (JRP), along with a Memorandum in support of the Petition. Thereafter, Claimant 
timely filed a Memorandum in Response to the Petition, together with an affidavit of Claimant's 
ORDER / DISSENTING OPINION - 1 
attorney. ISIF filed a reply on July 7,2006. To fully explore the parties' positions, the 
Commission held a hearing in Coeur d'Alene on October 11,2006. Present at the hearing were 
Commissioners Limbaugh, Kile and Maynard, Charles Graham representing Claimant, Kenneth 
Mallea on behalf of ISIF and Mark Monson on behalf of Defendant Employer and the State 
Insurance Fund. Also attending the hearing were Claimant and her husband, a representative of 
ISIF, and an associate from Mr. Graham's office. 
FACTS AND BACKGROUND 
In 1991 Claimant filed a complaint against Valley Vista Care Corp., (Valley) her 
employer at that time. Claimant's complaint was also against SIF and ISIF. Issues arose 
regarding total and permanent disability, pre-existing impairment and causation. Claimant 
eventually settled her claims with Valley and SIF. In 1994, Claimant entered into a Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement (LSSA) with ISIF, releasing ISIF &om all future Workers' compensation 
claims for her alleged total and permanent physical restrictions for the sum of $6,500. The 
Commission approved the LSSA between Claimant and ISIF on February 18, 1994. 
The current controversy stems from a new claim, filed by Claimant against ISIF on April 
26,2006. Claimant sustained a shoulder injury while cleaning tables as a custodian with St. 
Maries. Claimant alleges a number of pre-existing ailments, combined with this new shoulder 
injury, have rendered her totally and permanently disabled. ISIF denies liability. 
JURISDICTION 
A controversy exists in this case as Defendant ISIF has requested the Commission to 
interpret the 1994 LSSA. Because LSSAs are considered final orders of the Commission, a 
LSSA may be interpreted under Rule 15, JRP, and, therefore, a declaratory ruling on the 1994 
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LSSA is warranted. See: Davidson v. H.H. Keim Co., 110 Idaho 758,718 P.2d 1196 (1986). 
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES 
There are essentially five issues that have been argued by the parties: (1) collateral 
estoppel; (2) res judicata; (3) waiver; (4) quasi-estoppel; and (5) ISIF's authority to enter into a $ 
72-404 LSSA, which absolves ISF  from future liability as regards total and permanent liability 
claims. Each party has made extensive arguments on these issues, both in briefing and at the 
hearing. Both parties are commended for their scholarship concerning this Petition. 
ISIF contends that Claimant completely and voluntarily released ISIF from all future 
claims in 1994 by signing the LSSA. As a result, she should be collaterally estopped from 
pursuing another, similar complaint against the ISIF. ISIF goes on to allege that Claimant is 
attempting to re-litigate the same claim as was litigated in 1994, thus triggering the doctrine of 
res judicata. ISIF further argues that Claimant is estopped from asserting her most recent claim, 
due to the theory that Claimant waived her right to assert liability against ISlF when she signed 
the 1994 LSSA. This argument is similar to the collateral estoppel argument but is labeled as 
"waiver." 
Claimant contends the 1994 LSSA is void under Idaho Code $72-3 18(2) because it is an 
agreement between an employee (Claimant) and an employer to waive her rights to compensation 
under the Workers' Compensation Act. Claimant goes on to argue that the 1994 LSSA did not 
adequately compensate Claimant for total and permanent disability. Claimant further alleges that 
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar Claimant's new claim against ISIF 
as the same issues are not being litigated. Further, $ 72-318(2) bars the waiver of Workers' 
Compensation rights anyway. Finally, Claimant argues that a ruling in ISF's favor would 
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violate public policy. Claimant cites Cox v. Intermountain Lumber Co., 92 Idaho 197,439 P.2d 
931, (1968), for a reminder that the purpose of ISlF is to relieve employers of impaired or 
disabled persons of "the responsibility of paying for total disability compensation to [employees] 
rendered totally and permanently disabled because of [their] pre-existing handicap coupled 
with.. .subsequent injuries." See: Id., 92 Idaho at 200,439 P.2d at 934. 
ISlF responds that the statutory language of Idaho Code 5 72-318 does not apply. It only 
prohibits agreements between employees and employers. No such agreement is part of this 
situation. Further, ISIF is not an employer. ISIF states that Claimant was compensated for her 
claim of total disability when she was paid $6,500 as part of the LSSA. ISIF cites Idaho Code 5 
72-324 for ISIF's authority to settle claims where a claimant's status as a total-perm is disputed. 
Finally, ISlF argues that a ruling in its favor would not violate public policy. Claimant certainly 
did not think the LSSA was a violation of public policy in 1994. 
ANALYSIS 
The Commission appreciates the parties' thorough briefing and exemplary participation at 
the hearing in this matter. The parties have presented the Commission with thoughtful analysis 
and have argued their points extremely well. 
Idaho Code 8 72-318(2) 
The language of this provision is straightforward, and provides that: "No agreement by an 
employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid." Claimant argues that 
this language prohibits Claimant's agreement with ISIF that was reached in the 1994 LSSA. 
Claimant's position that Idaho Code 72-318(2) voids the 1994 LSSA is misplaced. This 
provision was established to prohibit an agreement between an employee and employer that 
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would limit the employee's rights to workers' compensation benefits. It does not limit a party's 
ability to negotiate and finalize an agreement to resolve benefit claims in a contested adjudication 
of those issues. 
The application of 5 72-3 18(2) can be described by the following simplistic examples. 
An employee takes a job at a convenience store. During the employee's second day of work, the 
employee and the employer enter into an agreement whereby the employer will have no liability 
for any workers' compensation benefits that might be due to the employee should he become 
injured at work, in exchange for a dollar an hour more in wages. Another example may be the 
situation, post-injury, when the injured worker agrees to waive his rights to any workers' 
compensation benefits if the employer retains his employment status. Both situations involve 
consideration for the agreement, but each fictional situation is clearly against the language and 
spirit of 5 72-31 8(2). In the case of a lump sum settlement agreement, however, the parties are 
voluntarily entering into an agreement over disputed claims that will release one party's liability 
in exchange for payment of funds. See: Idaho Code 5 72-404. 
Should Claimant's reasoning hold true, essentially no agreement under $5 72-404 and 72- 
324 could be valid. Not only would this destroy ISIF's willingness to enter into such agreements, 
but it would most certainly harm the interests of claimants, as they would lose the avenue of 
settlement as a possible option to resolve workers' compensation claims. The Commission is not 
willing to impose such a drastic handicap on either ISIF or claimants. 
The present situation has added complexity because an agreement with ISIF is requested 
only when a claimant alleges total and permanent disability. Total and permanent disability is 
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the highest assessment of disability that can be given to a worker, meaning that a worker cannot 
return competitively to the workforce. Thus, ISIF can be liable to an individual worker only one 
time, when the worker is totally and permanently disabled. The question then remains, who has 
the burden of determining whether a claimant is truly totally and permanently disabled and if 
they will be returning to work? When cases are litigated, the Commission makes a written, 
factual determination of total and permanent disability. 
In a workers' compensation case, which proceeds through the litigation process, there are 
evidentiary burdens placed upon the parties. Yet, inherent in the settlement process is the 
abandonment of the burden of proof. The parties need not go forward with testimony and 
documentary evidence to prove specific facts. The fundamental requirement for the approval of a 
lump sum settlement agreement is that the Commission determines that the settlement agreement 
"is for the best interest of all parties." See: Idaho Code 9 72-404. 
The 1994 LSSA set forth the parties' competing contentions regarding Claimant's total 
and permanent disability and ISIF liability. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332, ISIF is liable for 
the remainder of income benefits to an injured employee who has a pre-existing permanent 
physical impairment, which has combined with a subsequent industrial injury, causing the 
employee to be totally and permanently disabled. In the 1994 LSSA, Claimant claimed that she 
was totally and permanently disabled and unable to work, and that ISIF was liable for a portion of 
her disability due to preexisting conditions. See: 1994 LSSA p.2. 
As stated above the Commission does not make additional findings and determinations 
when approving a lump sum settlement. The Commission is directed to review the settlement to 
make sure it is in the best interests of all parties. Given the statements made by the parties in the 
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1994 LSSA, the Commission was within its authority to evaluate the document and approve the 
1994 LSSA granting Claimant a payment from ISIF. 
The administrative approval process does not produce any additional written 
determinations of a claimant's entitlement to benefits and the extent of disability, as are made 
after a contested hearing. Rather, a settlement avoids the necessity of any further administrative 
determination of those factual issues for the benefit of the parties. The 1994 LSSA was, more 
than anything else, an acknowledgement of Claimant's receipt of compensation for her alleged 
condition of total and permanent disability. 
The settlement process allows parties an expeditious resolution without the difficulties 
inherent to litigation. Lump sum settlement agreements are a respected way to reach an 
agreement that is acceptable to all parties. It is a rare case when the hearing and decision process 
makes even one party content with the outcome, let alone parties. A responsible employer 
and an injured worker are permitted to enter into a settlement with regard to compensation, but 
the agreement must be approved by the Commission. See: Idaho Code 5 72-404, -71 1. Upon 
approval, the agreement is for all purposes considered to be an award by the Commission. Id. 
The approved agreement constitutes a final decision of the Commission, which is subject to a 
motion for reconsideration or rehearing pursuant to Idaho Code 5 72-718. See: Drake v. 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 128 Idaho 880,882,920 P.2d 397,399 (1996). The 1994 
LSSA clearly set forth Claimants contention that she was totally and permanently disabled and 
unable to work. See: 1994 LSSA p. 2. 
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The 1994 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
The fundamental question to resolve is the impact of the 1994 settlement between 
Claimant and ISIF. Within the text of the 1994 LSSA, it becomes clear that the parties were not 
in agreement as to whether Claimant was totally and permanently disabled, whether the accident 
arose out of the course and scope of employment, whether Claimant had pre-existing physical 
impairments that had manifested, and apportionment. These disagreements do nothing to lessen 
the validity of the 1994 LSSA. Recognizing these disputes, the parties agreed to the following 
statement: 
The parties hereto acknowledge that there are serious questions and, therefore, 
disputes concerning the above issues. It is further acknowledged that this lump 
sum settlement is a compromise settlement of said issues as well as all other 
issues whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the 
parties. 
It is clear the parties freely intended to settle the issue of permanent disability through 
compromise. Even more important is the following language from the 1994 LSSA: 
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the lump sum 
vavment of $6.500.00 aneed to be vaid to Claimant hv the Fund is in 
A .  - 
consideration for and in pavment of anv and all claims that Claimant may now or 
hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of whatever nature or kind 
- 
for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, temporary disability 
compensation, permanent disability compensation and all other claims that 
claimant couldnow or hereafter make fir  benefits against the Fund under the 
Workers' Comvensation Laws of the State of Idaho. (emphasis added) 
This language clearly indicates Claimant's position in 1994. Claimant accepted $6,500 as 
consideration to support the 1994 LSSA between Claimant and ISF, even though Claimant 
could have litigated the case and potentially collected greater benefits for the rest of her life. The 
Commission did not force Claimant or ISIF to accept the 1994 LSSA. 
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Now, having been paid by ISIF for her claim that she was totally and permanently 
disabled, Claimant cannot claim again she is totally disabled. A worker may not collect for a 
second time workers' compensation benefits from ISIF for industrial injuries sustained after 
being classified as permanently and totally disabled, because the classification presumes that the 
worker is unable to work. A subsequent lesser disability cannot be superimposed upon the 
maximum disability recognized by the law. 
Summary of Theories 
It is clear that Claimant entered into the 1994 LSSA and received $6,500 as compensation 
for her disputed injury. It is irrelevant that ISIF did not concede Claimant's status as totally and 
permanently disabled. Claimant alleged total and permanent disability, voluntarily entered into 
the LSSA and received $6,500 as consideration for the release of her claim of total and 
permanent disability against ISIF. It is purely speculative for Claimant to engage in any 
discussion about the "real" worth of Claimant's settlement in 1994 compared to her present 
injury. She compromised all arguments in accepting the terms of the full and final settlement 
with ISIF. Once the Commission approved the terms of the settlement agreement, the settlement 
became a final award and judgment of the Commission. See: Davidson v. H.H Keim Co., 110 
Idaho 758,718 P.2d 1196 (1986). Moreover, Claimant still retained her rights to rehearing, 
reconsideration andlor appeal if she had "buyer's remorse" or truly had legitimate legal concerns 
over the validity of her settlement. Those rights lapsed when Claimant did not avail herself of 
those legal remedies. The Commission is not convinced by Claimant's arguments that the 1994 
LSSA is void under any circumstance. Nor is the Commission willing to open the door to 
potentially thousands of settlements fully and freely entered into by claimants, employers, 
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sureties, and the ISIF during the past 12 years. Lastly, a final award through the settlement 
process is not subject to modification. See: Idaho Code 72-719(4). 
ISIF has presented a number of theories regarding why Claimant's most recent claim 
should be barred: res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver, and quasi-estoppel. 
Res Judicata 
Res judicata is generally invoked to bar a subsequent suit between the same parties or 
their privies upon the same cause of action. See: Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 
724,552 P.2d 776 (1976). Idaho Code i j  72-718 codifies a variation of the doctrine of res 
judicata; decisions by the Commission are conclusive only as to matters actually adjudicated, 
rather than as to all matters which could have been adjudicated. See: Woodvine v. Triangle 
Dairy, Znc., 106 Idaho 716,682 P.2d 1263 (1984). It follows that a compensation agreement 
approved by the Commission is res judicata only with respect to matters actually determined by 
that agreement. See: Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284,756 P.2d 401 (1988). 
ISIF contends that Claimant is attempting to re-litigate the same claim as was litigated in 
1994, thus triggering the doctrine of res judicata. Claimant alleges that the doctrine of res 
judicata does not bar Claimant's new claim against ISIF, as the same issues are not being 
litigated. 
As discussed above, Claimant and ISIF entered into the 1994 LSSA to settle the issue of 
Claimant's total and permanent disability. The issue of Claimant's total and permanent disability 
and entitlement to benefits from ISIF was resolved by the 1994 LSSA, and is precluded by res 
judicata. 
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Collateral Estouvel 
Collateral estoppel will apply if each of the following questions is answered in the 
affirmative. 
1) Did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case? 
2) Was the issue decided in the prior litigation identical with the one presented in 
the action in question? 
3) Was the issue actually decided in the prior litigation? 
4) Was there a final judgment on the merits? 
5) Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a 
party to the prior adjudication? 
See: Jackman v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689,691,931 P.2d 1207, 1209 
(1997). 
ISIF contends that Claimant completely and voluntarily released ISIF from all future 
claims in 1994 by signing the LSSA. As a result, she should be collaterally estopped from 
pursuing another, similar complaint against the ISIF. Claimant alleges that the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel does not bar her new claim against ISIF, as the same issues are not being 
litigated. 
The issue settled by the 1994 LSSA is that of ISIF's liability to Claimant. ISIF is not 
liable for specific industrial accidents and the consequential injuries. ISIF is only liable when a 
claimant is totally and permanently disabled. Here, ISIF entered into the 1994 LSSA to resolve 
the issue of total and permanent disability. In the 1994 LSSA Claimant contended that she was 
totally and permanently disabled, and as such she was entitled to payments from ISIF. The 
parties entered into the settlement agreement to resolve the issue of Claimant's total and 
permanent disability. Claimant is precluded by collateral estoppel fmm asserting another claim 
against ISIF, which she specifically released from any future liability. 
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Waiver 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right. See: Brand S. Corp. 
v. King, 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981). ISIF argues that Claimant is estopped from 
asserting her most recent claim, due to the theory that Claimant waived her right to assert liability 
against ISIF when she signed the 1994 LSSA. Claimant avers that $72-318(2) bars the waiver of 
Workers' Compensation rights, including Claimant's right to pursue ISIF a second time. 
In the present case Claimant is not waiving her rights to compensation. She can be totally 
and permanently disabled once, and under the appropriate circumstances she can receive 
compensation from ISIF for her total and permanent disability only once. Claimant received 
compensation from ISIF for her claim of total and permanent disability in 1994. The express 
agreement of the parties waived any further claims against ISIF for total and permanent 
disability. 
Quasi-Estopvel 
Quasi-estoppel precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right 
inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. See: KTVB Inc., v. Boise City, 94 
Idaho 279,281,486 P.2d 992,994 (1971). This equitable theory of contract also applies here, as 
Claimant is currently taking a position inconsistent with her position during the signing of the 
1994 LSSA. In 1994, Claimant declared she was totally and permanently disabled and received 
settlement benefits as a result thereof. Claimant was represented by an attorney and explicitly 
endorsed the 1994 LSSA through her signature. Claimant's current position, that the 1994 LSSA 
is void, is contrary to her explicit declaration, and is clearly prejudicial to ISIF. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Petition for Declaratory Ruling should be, and is hereby, 
GRANTED. As a result, Claimant's current claim against ISIF is barred due to the 1994 Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement, which fully, finally and forever discharged and released ISLF from 
all future liability on account of Claimant's total and permanent disability. 
7d.J 
DATED this /? day of& ,2007, 
INDUSTFSAL. COMMISSION 
ATTEST: 
Commissioner R.D. Maynard dissenting: 
After thoroughly reviewing the applicable statutes and existing case law regarding this 
matter, I respectfully dissent from the conclusions of the majority. The lump sum settlement 
agreement was void, ab initio, pursuant to the plain meaning of Idaho Code § 72-3 18(2). 
Idaho Code 5 72-318(2) reads, "No agreement by an employee to waive his rights to 
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compensation under this act shall be valid." As stated by the majority, the statute is intended to 
prohibit an agreement that might [prospectively] limit an employee's @ture] rights to workers' 
compensation benefits. This interpretation of the statute is supported by the Idaho Supreme 
Court. See, Emery v. J.R. Simplot Co., 141 Idaho 407, 11 1 P.3d 92 (2005). The practical 
application of this statute is evident upon review of virtually any lump sum agreement between 
an employee and employer. Employee/employer agreements do not contain prospective language 
limiting recovery in the event of a hture injury - even when the employee continues working for 
the same employer post-injury. A simple reading of the statute reveals that it is not limited to 
only an agreement between an employee and employer. 
Although lump sum agreements are routinely used to resolve and dispose of claims for 
benefits of present injuries, the language used in the present agreement not only resolves the 
benefits due Claimant on the present injury, but also any and all future claims for benefits. The 
problematic language in the Wemecke agreement reads as follows: 
It is understood and agreed by and between the parties hereto that the lump 
sum payment of $6,500.00 agreed to be paid to Claimant by the Fund is in 
consideration for and in payment of any and all claims that Claimant may 
now or hereafter have, including but not limited to every claim of whatever 
nature or kind for medical expenses, prescriptions, psychiatric care, 
temporary disability compensation, permanent disability compensation and 
all other claims that Claimant could now or hereafter make for beneJits 
against the Fund under the Workers' Compensation Laws of the State of 
Idaho. This is the case whether or not the full extent of Claimant's 
damages, disability, loss, expenses or claims are now known or foreseen, 
and regardless of whether the Claimant shall ever again injure herselfin 
another orfiture accident, or suffer any disease which would arguable 
cause the Fund to be liable for additional claims or benefits under the laws 
of the State of Idaho. Acceptance of this agreement by the Claimant 
according to the terms and conditions stated herein, shall fully and 
completely discharge the Fund from liability from any claims forever, 
regardless of whether such claims arise from the accident which is the 
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subject of this cause, or any accidents, injuries, diseases, impairments, 
disabilities or deformities existing prior thereto or hereafev arising. 
(Emphases added.) Clearly, ISIF wanted to create an agreement by which Claimant waived her 
rights to future compensation - a practice that is strictly prohibited by Idaho Code fi 72-318(2). 
The assertion that the ISIF includes such language in nearly every lump sum settlement 
agreement does not legitimize the process. "The Industrial Commission as 'an administrative 
agency is a creature of statute, limited to the power and authority granted to it by the Legislature 
and may not exercise its sub-legislative powers to modify, alter, or enlarge the legislative act 
which it administers.' Accordingly, the Commission exercises only that discretion granted by the 
Legislature." Simpson v. Louisiana-PaciJic Corp., 134 Idaho 209,212,998 P.2d 1122, 1 125 
(2000). The application of fi 72-318(2) to the language in ISIF lump sum agreements is a matter 
of first impression. After thorough research, I was unable to find a case with similar facts and an 
equivalent argument. Now that the ISIF's prospective language is being challenged, the 
Commission is charged by the Legislature and directed by the Court to apply the facts of this case 
to the law. If the statute is unambiguous, it must be applied as written. The majority's desire to 
interpret the statute differently for public policy reasons is not permissible when the statute's 
plain meaning is clear - any agreement by a claimant to waive his or her rights to workers' 
compensation is invalid. 
Assuming, arguendo, that ISIF could leap the initial hurdle posed by the plain meaning of 
Idaho Code fi 72-318(2), the matter of ISIF's authority to enter into this agreement must be 
addressed. Idaho Code fi 72-332(1) addresses the circumstances that must exist in order for a 
claimant to be entitled to payment from the Industrial Special Indemnity account: 
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If an employee who has a permanent physical impairment from any cause or origin, 
incurs a subsequent disability by an injury or occupational disease arising out of and 
in the course of his employment, and by reason of the combined effects of both the 
pre-existing impairment and the subsequent injury or occupational disease.. .suffers 
total and permanent disability, the employer and surety shall be liable for payment of 
compensation benefits only for the disability caused by the injury or occupational 
disease.. .and the injured employee shall be compensated for the remainder of his 
income benefits out of the industrial special indemnity account. 
ISIF is not a surety. "ISJJ? was created to encourage employers to hire handicapped persons 'with 
the obligation only to pay compensation for an industrial injury to the handicapped person such 
amount as the employer would have had to pay an employee who had not been handicapped with 
ISIF assuming responsibility for the balance of the total permanent disability.' " Tagg v. 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 123 Idaho 95,97,844 P.2d 1345, 1347 (1993) (internal 
citations omitted). Therefore, it is axiomatic that ISF's lump sum agreements should not be 
entered into as a means to unreasonably limit its liability. JSF should not be assessing whether it 
is better to enter into a lump sum agreement with the claimant now because, in the future, he or 
she might suffer an injury that puts ISIF on the hook for greater liability. That is, in fact, why 
ISIF was created - to pay benefits to a claimant who suffers a work injury that combines with a 
pre-existing condition that renders him or her totally and permanently disabled. Settling a case 
prematurely (i.e. before there is some amount of evidence that the claimant is actually totally and 
permanently disabled and unable to return to work) as a "business decision" does not follow the 
intent for the creation and purpose of the ISIF. 
Additionally, it is not irrelevant that ISIF did not concede total and permanent disability. 
The majority would have you believe that a claimant's assertion of total and permanent disability 
is adequate information for all parties, including the Commission, to proceed with the settlement. 
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On the contrary, it is proper for the Commission "to consider the underlying merits of the 
Claimants' [sic] claims when making its statutorily required determination as to whether the 
settlement agreements were 'for the best interest of all parties.' Without some preliminary 
inquiry into the merits of the claim, the Commission cannot properly judge whether an injured 
worker is surrendering a strong claim for too small a settlement, or whether the ISIF is unwisely 
satisfying spurious claims at great cost." Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Commission, 141 Idaho 129, 
137, 106 P.3d 455,463 (2005). By this, the Idaho Supreme Court declared that the 
Commission's approval of lump sum settlements was not simply a rubber stamp to the wishes 
and assertions of the parties. 
Moreover, the proposition that a void finding would impose a drastic handicap on ISIF 
and claimants is overstated. The only situation that should give ISIF pause is one in which a 
claimant's total and permanent disability status is so questionable that more than a mere chance 
exists the claimant may return to work. Even then, the only event that could trigger additional 
ISIF liability is another industrial accident that causes additional impairment and, again, 
combines with the claimant's prior impairment - hardly a situation that would effect thousands 
of settlements. 
Of paramount importance is the understanding that this dissent's interpretation of Idaho 
Code §§ 72-3 18(2) and 72-332(I) in no way opens the door for duplicate claims against the ISIF. 
As long as a modicum of evidence exists that a claimant was totally and permanently disabled 
and met the requirements of 3 72-332(1), and ISIF stipulated to the claimant's condition and its 
liability in the prior agreement, a new claim against ISIF could be defended on the basis that the 
claimant was totally and permanently disabled prior to the new injury. A strong defense since the 
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claimant and ISlF would have stipulated to total and permanent disability when settling the prior 
dispute. "Collateral estoppel applies to issues that actually and necessarily have been decided in 
prior litigation." Brown v. Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 138 Idaho 493,496,65 P.3d 515, 
518 (2003). Therefore, not only is prospective language waiving a claimant's right to future 
benefits in violation of 5 72-318(2), it is wholly unnecessary in curtailing ISlF's future liability. 
Finally, it bears repeating that "the provisions of the Worker's [sic] Compensation Law 
are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee." Spvague v. CaldweIZ Transp. Znc., 116 
Idaho 720,721,779 P.2d 395,396 (1989). The humane purposes for which the law was 
promulgated leave no room for narrow, technical construction. Id. ISlF's attempt to draft an 
agreement within which Claimant waives future rights to workers' compensation benefits voids 
the agreement. A void agreement renders ISIF's arguments in favor of a declaratory ruling moot. 
Therefore, ISIF's motion for a declaratory ruling should be denied, and Claimant's claim against 
ISIF should be allowed to proceed through the regular administrative hearing process. 
For the above reasons, I must respectfully dissent. 
Dated this January, 2007. 
WDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
P I hereby certify that on the /? day o 07, a true and correct copy of 
Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling was s nited States Mail upon each of 
the following: 
CHARLES L GRAHAM 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
MARK T MONSON 
PO BOX 8456 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
KENNETH L MALLEA 
PO BOX 857 
MERIDIAN ID 83680 
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David J. Lee, ISB No. 4073 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720 
(208) 332-2100 
"7 < - -  0 
Attorney for Defendants School District 41 Joint and State Insurance Fund X:T d .c.
-r w 
A u 
PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE, ) ICNO.: 01-510641 
1 03-515254 ' 
Claimant, ) 03-502068 
03-521005 
VS. 
) SIF NO.: 200111425 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT, ) 200311850 1 
200301596 ' 
) 200316212 / Employer, 
and 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Surety, 1 
Defendant ) 
In consideration of the premises, promises and covenants hereinafter set forth and subject 
to the approval of the Agreement by the Industrial Commission, the parties hereto enter into the 
following Lump Sum Agreement and request an order of the Commission discharging the 
Defendants from liability pursuant to Section 72-404, Idaho Code. 
m: The parties shall be designated herein as follows: 
PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE is the Claimant herein and during all relevant 
times was an employee of SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT, hereinafter referred to as 
"Employer"; Employer was insured for its workers compensation liability by STATE 
INSURANCE FUND, hereinafier referred to as "Surety". The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION of 
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* .  
the State of Idaho, hereinafter referred to as the "Commission", has the exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear, determine and make the appropriate award and order in this matter. 
SECOND: Claimant alleges that, on or about July 17,2001 while she was employed by 
said Employer, she suffered an injury to her neck and left shoulder whiie in the course and scope 
of her employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 49 years of age and manied. 
Claimant worked 40 hours a week earning $8.00 per hour. Timely notice was given to the 
Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. 
Claimant further alleges that, on or about October 8, 2002 while she was employed by 
said Employer, she suffered an injury to her right . shoulder while in the course and scope of her 
employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 50 years of age and married. Claimant 
A 
worked 35 hours a week earning $8.26 per hour. Timely notice was given to the Employer and 
Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. 
Claimant further alleges that, on or about January 10, 2003 while she was employed by 
said Employer, she suffered an injury to her left fifth finger while in the course and scope of her 
employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 50 years of age and married. Claimant 
worked 35 hours a week earning $8.26 per hour. Timely notice was given to the Employer and 
Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. 
Claimant further alleges that, on or about September 26, 2003 while she was employed 
by said Employer, she suffered an injury to her right shoulder while in the course and scope of 
her employment. At the time of said injury, Claimant was 51 years of age and married. 
Claimant worked 35 hours a week earning $8.26 per hour. Timely notice was given to the 
Employer and Surety and benefits were paid pursuant to the Idaho Workers Compensation Act. 
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m: As will appear &om the medical reports following her July 17, 2001 accident, 
Claimant was primarily treated by Benewah Community Hospital and St. Maries Family 
Medicine for cervical and left shoulder strain. 
As will appear &om the medical reports following her October 8, 2002 and September 
26, 2003 accidents, Claimant was primarily treated by Steven Pennington, M.D. for subacromial 
impingement and a rotator cuff tear of the right shoulder. On June 20, 2003, Dr. Pennington 
performed subacromial decompression and rotator cuff repair. Claimant suffered a recurrent 
rotator cuff tear and on January 8,2004, Dr. Pennington performed debridement and rotator cuff 
repair. On July 6,2004, Dr. Pennington found Claimant was at maximum medical improvement. 
On September 9, 2004, Claimant was evaluated by Carl Brunjes, M.D. at the request of the 
Surety. Dr. Brunjes found Claimant had sustained a 7% permanent partial impairment of the 
upper extremity. Claimant subsequently returned to Dr. Pennington with complaints of recurrent 
right shoulder pain. Dr. Pennington referred Claimant to Edwin Tingstad, M.D. for evaluation 
and treatment. Dr. Tingstad diagnosed biceps tendon instability with subscapularis tear. On April 
2, 2005, Claimant was evaluated by Eugene Toomey, M.D. at the request of the Surety. Dr. 
Toomey diagnosed adhesive capsulitis and preexisting acromioclavicular arthritis. Dr. Toomey 
found Claimant had sustained no additional permanent partial impairment. 
As will appear from the medical reports following her January 10, 2003 accident, 
Claimant was primarily treated at St. Maries Family Medicine for fracture of the left fifth finger. 
FOURTH: The Employer and Surety have paid Claimant the following medical benefits: 
DO1 7/17/01 
Doctors 
St. Maries Family Medicine 
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Hospitals 
Benewah Community Hospital 
Phvsical Theraoy 
Benewah Community Hospital 
Mileage 
Claimant Reimbursement 
Miscellaneous 
Benewah Community Hospital 
Edward Van Vooren, M.D. 
Jack's Pharmacy 
Total Medical Paid to Date: 
Doctors 
Charles Jacobson, M.D. 
Steven Pennington, M.D. 
Edwin Tingstad, M.D. 
- 
OMAC 
Hospitals 
Gritman Medical Center 
Physical Therapy 
Benewah Community Hospital 
Gritman Medical Center 
Kootenai Medical Center 
Mileage 
Claimant Reimbursement 
Miscellaneous 
Radiology Consultants Gritman 
Harbor Xnesthesia Services 
Gritman Medical Center 
Steven Pennington, M.D. 
Edwin Tingstad, M.D. 
Jack's Pharmacy 
Marketime Drug 
Total Medical Paid to Date: 
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Claimant agrees to allow Surety to provide to the Commission any medical records reasonably 
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Agreement. 
FIFTH: There are genuine and substantial disputes and differences between the parties as 
-
to the degree, if any, of Claimant's impairment and disability, the need for retraining benefits and 
the need for future medical benefits. The parties, however, wish to settle their differences on a 
full and final basis advising the Commission that it is in the best interests of the parties to do so. 
Therefore, as provided by Idaho Code Section 72-404, in an effort to settle this disputed matter, 
the Surety tenders to the Claimant and the Claimant accepts the sum of $56,284.70 in full and 
final settlement of any and all claims she has or may have as a result of any of the alleged 
injuries described herein. Further, the parties agree to waive any underpayment of total 
temporary disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits which may exist for any 
reason, including any underpayments that may exist as a result of the method used to calculate 
the compensation rate(s). 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD BETWEEN THE PARTIES THAT THE 
CLAIMANT AGREES TO PAY ALL OUTSTANDING MEDICAL BILLS NOT LISTED TN 
THE FOURTH SECTION OF THIS AGREEMENT AND THE EMPLOYER AND SURETY 
WILL NOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR, NOR DO THEY ASSUME LIABILITY FOR, ANY 
OTHER MEDICAL BILLS WHATSOEVER AND THAT SAID LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
SHALL BE APPORTIONED AS FOLLOWS: 
LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
Total Temvorarv Disability Benefits 
DO1 711 7101 
711 7/01 through 8/05/01 
2 weeks, 6 days at $222.75 per week 
TOTAL DUE 
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DO1 10/08/02 
6/20/03 through 811 7/03 
8 weeks, 3 days at $237.15 per week 
10/07/03 through 1213 1/03 
12 weeks, 2 days at $237.15 per week 
110 1/04 through 7/06/04 
26 weeks, 6 days at $240.30 per week 
1011 1/04 through 11/10/04 
4 weeks, 3 days at $240.30 per week 
1111 1/04 through 12/31/04 
7 weeks, 2 days at $240.30 per week 
1/01/05 through 3/24/05 
11 weeks, 6 days at $244.35 per week 
TOTAL DUE 
Temporaw Partial Disabilitv Benefits 
Retraining Benefits 
Permanent Partial Impairment 
DO1 10/08/02 
7% upper extremity at 2 1 
weeks at $289.30 per week 
TOTAL DUE 
Future Medical Benefits 
Unav~ortioned Disvuted 
Impairment and Additional 
Disabilitv Benefits at 36% 
whole person at 180 weeks 
at $289.30 per week 
In consideration for this Lump 
Sum Agreement vursuant to 
Idaho Code Section 72-404, 
waiver of rie;ht of apveal, 
waiver of right of 
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reconsideration. waiver 
of ri&t of modification 
Less TTD previously paid 
DO1 7/17/01 
DO1 10/08/02 
Less TPD previously paid 
Less Retraining oaid 
Less PPI previzsly paid 
DO1 10108102 
Less LSS advance paid 
TOTAL AMOUNT DUE CLAIMANT 
CLAIMANT'S ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS: 
A. Attorney fees taken prior to LSS 
B. Costs taken prior to LSS 
C. Additional attorney fees to be taken from LSS 
D. Additional costs to be taken from LSS 
ITEMIZED LIST OF OUTSTANDING MEDICALS TO 
BE PAID BY CLAIMANT FROM LUMP SUM 
SETTLEMENT BALANCE: (List provider and amounts.) 
E. Total of Outstanding Medicals 
NET AMOUNT TO CLAIMANT 
(Subtract Lines C & D relating 
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none 
to attorney fees, and Line E 
relating to outstanding medicals, 
from the total amount due 
Claimant of this LSS) 
The parties acknowledge and agree that, of the $56,284.70 lump sum money represented 
by this Agreement, the sum of $3,000.00 is allocated to consideration of settlement and waiver of 
right to reconsideration and appeal. The parties further acknowledge and agree that the lump sum 
to be paid to Claimant under the terms of this Agreement is compensation for disability which 
will affect Claimant for the rest of her life. Claimant's remaining life expectancy is 328 months 
(Period Life Table 2002, updated June 2006). Therefore, even though paid in a lump sum, 
Claimant's net benefits afier deduction of attorney fees ($14,071.00), settlement consideration 
($3,000.00), and litigation costs ($339.98), shall be considered to be $118.51 for 328 months, 
beginning August 1,2007. 
m: The parties advise the Commission that they believe that it is in their best 
interests that this disputed matter be settled as herein set forth. 
The parties acknowledge that the nature and extent of the temporary disability and 
permanent partial disability and medical and related expenses in this matter are uncertain and 
may be continuing or progressive and may substantially exceed those hereinabove set forth, and 
the above shall not limit the scope of this Agreement or the Order of Discharge entered by the 
Commission pursuant hereto, both of which contemplate and include all rights and claims to all 
permanent and temporary disability benefits, all impairment benefits and all medical and related 
benefits whether or not known, herein listed, discoverable or contemplated by the parties. 
The Claimant does agree to indemnifl, defend and hold Defendants harmless from and 
against any further claim or loss of any and every kind arising out of or related to the said alleged 
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accident, and any resultant losses, damages or injuries, including without limit, any claim 
respecting past or future hospital, medical or like expenses. 
SEVENTH: The Claimant acknowledges and agrees that she has carefully read this 
instrument in its entirety and has been fully advised regarding the contents of this Agreement by 
her counsel, that Claimant understands its contents and has signed same knowing that the 
payment forever concludes, settles and fully disposes of any and all claims of any kind and 
nature and character that she now has or may have individuaIIy against Employer and Surety on 
account of the alleged injuries and that these proceedings are concluded and forever discharged 
and that they may be dismissed with prejudice by reason hereof, subject only to the 
Commission's order and approval. 
Pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08033, a memorandum from Claimant's counsel accompanies 
this Agreement setting forth the required information regarding Claimant's attorney's fees. 
EIGHTH: Upon the Commission's order approving this Agreement and subject to the 
payment of $56,284.70, the balance due Claimant, the Employer and Surety shall be discharged 
and released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-described accidents and 
injuries. 
DATED this day of ,2007. 
PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE 
Claimant 
Attorney for Claimant 
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Assistant ~un&k&a~er, State Insurance 
Fund /? 
hool District 41 Joint, and Surety, 
State In u ce Fund. r 
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ORDER 
Upon the foregoing and good cause appearing and the Industrial Commission being fully 
advised and having determined that it is for the best interests of the parties that the liability of the 
Employer and Surety be discharged in whole by the payment of the Lump Sum Agreement as 
provided therein, NOW THEREFORE: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Lump Sum Agreement be and it hereby is approved 
as provided by Section 72-404 Idaho Code, and that the above-entitled proceedings are dismissed 
with prejudice and the Employer, School District 41 Joint, and the Surety, are discharged and 
released of and from any and all liability on account of the above-entitled injuries. 
DATED: n ? 
v 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ASSISTANT SE 
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COMMISSIONER 
BY 
COMMISSIONER 
David J. Lee. ISB No. 4073 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 W. State - 
- Statehouse Mail 3 5% 
Boise, ID 83720 c 53 m 
(208) 332-2100 " Ex 23 c1z FJ 
Attorney for Defendants School District 41 Joint and State Insurance Fund rn o 0- 
g 4  
2s: -0 
PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE, ) ICNO.: 01-510241 
\ 03-5 15254 
Claimant, 03-502068 
03-521005 
VS. ) 
) SIFNO.: 200111425 
SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT, 1 2003 1 1850 
1 200301 596 
Employer, 1 200316212 
and ) STIPULATION & ORDER 
) FOR DISMISSAL 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, ) WITH PREJUDICE 
Surety, 
Defendant ) 
COMES NOW, the Claimant, PATRICIA (PATSY) A. WERNECKE, by and through 
her attorney of record, Charles L. Graham, and the Defendants, SCHOOL DISTRICT 41 JOINT 
and the STATE INSURANCE FUND, by and through their attorney of record, David J. Lee, and 
stipulate and agree that the above-numbered cause has been settled and, subject only to the 
payment of the sums ordered in the Commission's Order of Approval and Discharge, the above- 
styled and numbered cause may be dismissed with prejudice. 
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DATED this X b f i  day of ,2007. 
ug&b, l4' i 4 L . L  
CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
Attorney for Claimant , 
int and Surety, 
State Insura e Fund 
- P 
ORDER -
Pursuant to the above and foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above styled and numbered cause be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
DATED: 4 4 3 6  7 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on AU6 1 0 2001 a true and correct copy of LUMP SUM 
AGREEMENT AND STIPULATION AND ORDER FOR DISMISSAL WITH 
PREXJDICE, IC #03-515254, was served by the method indicated below upon each of 
the following: 
r>c ,Mail Courier HAND DELIVERED 
CHARLES L GRAHAM ESQ 
PO BOX 9344 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
State Insurance Fund 
1215 West State Street 
Statehouse Mail 
Boise, ID 83720-0044 
CHARLES L. GRAHAM 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
P.O. Box 9344 
414 S. Jefferson 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Idaho Bar No. 3839 
BEFORE T m  INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WERNECKE, 1 
) 
ClaimantiAppellant, ) LC. 15-000083 
) (03-5 15254) 
VS. 1 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL ) 
SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND, 1 
1 
DefendantlRespondent. 1 
\ 
TO: Respondent, State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund and its attorney, Kenneth L. 
Mallea, Mallea Law Offices, P.0. Box 857, Meridian, ID 83680; and the Clerk of the Idaho 
industrial Commission: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Appellant, Patsy Wernecke, appeals against the Respondent, State of Idaho Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF) to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Idaho Industrial 
Commission's interlocutory Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, entered in the above- 
entitled proceeding on January 19,2007, Chairman James F. Kile presiding. The Industrial 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-I 
Commission's final Order for Dismissal With Prejudice was entered in this proceeding on 
August 9,2007. 
2. Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Order on Petition 
for Declaratory Ruling described in paragraph 1 above is an appealable order under and pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 l(d) and 14(b). 
3. The issues Appellant intends to assert in this appeal are: 
(a) Whether the Industrial Commission correctly determined that Ms. Wernecke's 
claim against the ISIF is barred by the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver, and 
quasi-estoppel; 
(b) Whether the 1994 Lump Sum Settlement Agreement (LSSA) between Ms. 
Wernecke and ISIF is void under Idaho Code 5 72-3 18(2) because it is an agreement by an 
employee, Ms. Wernecke, to waive her rights to compensation under the Worker's 
Compensation Act; and 
(c) Whether ISIF has the authority to enter into agreements with claimants settling 
claims where ISIF denies that it is liable for total and permanent disability. 
4. No order has been entered sealing any portion of the record. 
5. No transcript is requested. 
6. Appellant requests no documents be included in the agency's record other than those 
automatically included under I.A.R. 28. 
7. I certify: 
(a) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Idaho Industrial Commission's 
record has been paid. 
(b) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-2 
(c) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
yL\ 
DATED THIS & day of August, 2007. 
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A. 
By: [ b k <  L .. L L  
C arles L. Graham 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
h 
I hereby certify that on this 6 day of August, 2007, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following individuals in the 
manner indicated below: 
Kenneth L. Mallea 
Mallea Law Offices 
PO Box 857 
Meridian ID 83680 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund 
Department of Administration 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-7901 
Clerk, Idaho Industrial Commission 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-3 
[ X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ I Fax [ ] Hand Delivery 
[ X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
1 I Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ X ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
I I Fax [ ] Hand Delivery 
. -  I k L  
Charles L. Graham 
, / . I C " J  
PATSY WERNECKE, , f 
1 
S E a  + 
Claimant-Appellant, ) 
v. ) SUPREME COURT NO. 3 q539 
1 
ST. MARIES JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT #041, 
Employer, and STATE INSURANCE FUND, Surety, 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
) 
Defendants, 
and 
STATE OF IDAHO INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL 1 
INDEMNITY FUND, 3 
Defendant-Respon+k._,.- 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission, 
James F. Kile, Chairman presiding 
Case Number: IC 15-000083 (03-5 15254) 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellant: 
Order on Petition for Declaratory 
Ruling, filed January 19,2007. 
Charles L. Graham 
Po Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Attorney for Respondent: Kenneth L. Mallea 
PO Box 857 
Meridian, ID 83680 
Appealed By: Claimant/Appellant 
Appealed Against: DefendanVRespondent 
Notice of Appeal Filed: August 30,2007 
Appellate Fee Paid: Incorrectly made out to 
Clerk of the Idaho Industrial 
Commission - returned to 
Appellant on August 3 1,2007 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL FOR WERNECKE - 1 
SEP . 4 2007 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
Joan Marshall, C.S.R. 
M&M Court Reporting Services, Inc. 
8 16 Sherman Avenue #7 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Standard transcript has been requested. Transcript 
has been prepared and filed with the Commission. 
CERTJFICATE OF APPEAL FOR WERNECKE - 2 
CERTIFICATION 
I, Carol J. Haight, the undersigned Assistant Commission Secretary of the hdustrial 
Commission of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct 
photocopy of the Notice of Appeal, filed August 30,2007; Order on Petition for Declaratory Ruling, 
filed January 19,2007; and the whole thereof, in IC # 15-000083 (03-515254) for Patsy Wemecke. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal of said 
czr 
Commission this 2 day of -2007. 
CERTImCATlON OF RECORD 
I, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission, do hereby certify 
that thc foregoing record contains true and correct copies of all pleadings, documents, and papers 
designated to be included in the Agency's Record on appeal by Rule28(3) of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules and by the Notice of Appeal, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 28(b). 
I further certify that all exhibits offered or admitted in this proceeding, if any, are 
correctly listed in the Certificate of Exhibits (i). Said exhibits will be lodged with the Supreme 
Court upon settlement of the Record herein. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 1st day of November, 2007. 
INDUSTRW; COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD - 1 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
PATSY WRNECKE, 1 
1 
ClaimantIAppellant, ) SUPREME COURT NO. 34539 
v. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTWL ) NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
SPECIAL N E M N I T Y  FUND, 1 
1 
DefendantIRespondent. 1 
\ 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; 
AND CHARJ.,ES L. GRAHAM, ESQ. FOR CLAIMANT PATSY WERNECKE; 
AND KENNETH L. MALLEA, ESQ. FOR DEFlENDANT STATE OF IDAHO, 
INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL INDEMNITY FUND. 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
Charles L. Graham Kenneth L. Mallea 
P.O. Box 9344 P.O. Box 857 
Moscow, ID 83843 Meridian, ID 83680 
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, 
all parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the 
Record, including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to 
the Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Record shall be 
deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 1st day of November, 2007. 
Assistant Commission Secretary 
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